



On Preventing War

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ON PREVENTING WAR

By Mason Gaffney

Against weapons of the future natural science can offer no defense. So speak the natural scientists themselves. The only retaliation in atomic war is an exterminatory counter-offensive, serving more as revenge than defense, for, of our artifacts, only the atomic and poison projectors will be secured from destruction in the first cataclysmic assault. Having produced a weapon whose blows they cannot parry, natural scientists as such have rendered themselves useless as defenders of the nation. But as thinking persons, natural scientists can yet be the mainstay of national defense. Their abilities are challenged by a task more important than any they have ever accomplished: the prevention of war. The producers of atomic bombs cannot discharge their social responsibilities by teaching congressmen nuclear physics, nor by telling others that they must prevent another war. On natural scientists themselves the obligation of war prevention most heavily falls. They gave to society the fantastic agencies of destruction that must be controlled; they are most familiar with the scientific method of thought which alone can discover ways to prevent war; and their services in their present capacity are valueless while society cannot use their products.

For generations social science has failed to cure the social disorders which bring war and many other evils, yet the wisest men have ever forwarded the arts of material progress and ignored social science. For centuries the results have been unfortunate; now they promise to be calamitous in a degree hitherto-

to inconceivable. Further advance in natural science is worse than useless until social progress has made it possible for us to live on the same earth with our products. Probably no one reading these words has not heard similar expressions time and again. But the direction of social energy indicates that few have taken the message personally. The compensatory development of social science will not take care of itself. Social energy can only be diverted from the overdeveloped to the under developed by a migration of talented natural scientists into social science. Had Newton or Darwin but laid foundations for social studies as effectively as they did for physics and biology, society might be today free from the fear of war. In their time, perhaps, natural science need their services as much as social, but today no natural scientist can say his research will be useful to a society bent on using the products for war. Natural scientists can discharge their obligation to mankind, and to themselves as men, by taking up social studies in order to prevent war and preserve the society of which they are interdependent members.

Some scientists cherish a contempt for the personnel of social science which masks from them the critical significance of those persons' function. A small intellectual advance in social science can improve human living more than a lifetime's worth of difficult intellectual progress in better developed subjects. Immense human results depend on simple, primitive social ideas. Such simple inventions of applied social science as standing impersonal law, enforced private contract, or the corporation, have served as frameworks within which millions of humans have guided their lives, and peacefully cooperated to

produce the surpluses on which natural scientists exist while they work for the far future. Social scientists have mostly been haphazardly unscientific, yet their work has been as useful to society as that of the much wiser group of natural scientists, because the object of their work has been so much more important in human life. The ratio of material improvement gained to intellectual energy expended is high in social science. It is a powerful tool. That it is now the domain of unscientific scholars only emphasizes the usefulness of the subject matter for, despite the scholars' incapacity, applied social science, with all its imperfections, is essential to the success of the human species. The greatest contributions to human well being wrought by man's thinking power are those that help him cooperate, for cooperation is the environmental basis of human progress. Crude as the doctrines of economics and politics seem, they guide governments in defining channels for that wonderful complex of cooperation which unites the powers of men in whatever number and for whatever purpose they may wish. Social science, effectively developed, can guide cooperation so much better than it does today that the atomic war we fear will never occur.

The intellectual migration I propose would be in vain if the migrant scientists limited themselves to the same bounds within which most social scientists restrict themselves. I do not propose that they duplicate the fruitless trivia whose compilation requires the working hours of so many social scientists today. The mission of the migrant economists, political scientists and sociologists is a complete critical examination of the basic rules of sovereignty under which society lives, to discover in them causes of war, and to devise new rules under which we may

live in peace. The defenses which may be found in social science are not such ineffective superficialities as the international control now envisaged. The only effective defense is no less an achievement than the abolition of war. While nations want to fight each other international controls only serve the dangerous purpose of stilling the demand for radical action. The task I propose is not light, but neither are the problems that we face. Little comfort can be found in today's world for the complacent. No longer is the deluge to come after us. But against the hard alternative of atomic warfare stands a wonderful opportunity for ambitious men of science to lead mankind into a better life than it has ever known.

For them to do so requires that they become obsessed with social science, at the expense of their present occupations. We would like to believe we may live out our lives in the security we have known, pursuing the interests that most take our fancy or fill our purses, while government takes care of itself and of us without our attention. The energy and adjustment reform demands we very rightly do not care to expend, if the expenditure is evitable. Government is a means, not an end, and we should not have to devote our entire attention to it. But from the coming changes is no escape. Either by our own initiative, or else by the compulsion of inescapable circumstance, drastic changes in society will be made within the next two generations. If not our conscious united effort, then the chaos and terror of war will be the agent of their coming. Some seem to think that the warmakers of the world succumbed in the ashes of the defeated Axis powers. They are wrong. The Axis powers were products of our own civilization, a civilization which has produced a cont-

ual series of wars. Our fantastic new weapons have evoked no significant change in that civilization, but only increased the warlike emotions of fear and national pride. Without some drastic change, we will engage in an atomic war. The atomic bomb is new, but society is old and has revealed its character so fully in the past that no doubt exists of what men, as organized at present, will do to each other when armed with the primordial source of energy. The familiar patterns of behavior have not altered. The fear and hate emotions are potentially as strong as ever and, as we will be armed in the future contest, far more effective: effective enough to send the remnants of our species reeling backward in culture to long forgotten barbarities, or, perhaps, to exterminate us utterly.

This is not the sort of war whose prospect is less terrifying than the prospect of drastic social change. This sort of war will itself bring the most drastic, most destructive and useless change imaginable. Pessimists, viewing the situation, have given way to hopeless despair. But despair has no place in the emotional arsenal of those who intend to survive. Life brings us now again the age-old challenge: adjust or perish. Those who are prepared to meet life's challenge will do so with a grim pleasure, a knowledge that millenia of brutal selection have prepared them, at least, to hold their place as the fittest species in earth history. They will adjust their lives, at whatever cost, to meet the emergency requirements of social change.

Scientists have not been totally unaware of their responsibility. Even as I write their organizations for social action are in operation. They have expressed their awareness of and concern

over the social problems posed by atomic energy. They have contributed to popular and political education in nuclear physics, and urged politicians to do something international and grand and vague about preventing war with atomic bombs. But these activities are nothing to what must be done. Social science is still the domain of the "liberals" and "conservatives", each of which groups opines that its pre-war program was and is satisfactory. The merit of their beliefs is reflected in world conditions. Small wars are actually raging in some countries, and responsible Americans have seriously considered going to war with Russia. Our ideas are so convincing to other nations that only our great power gives us influence. The present development of popular psychology, and related economic phenomena, parallel strikingly that which preceded the last war. All signs point to another cycle of expansion, depression, revolution, and war.

But these signs, indicating the need for reform, to some more vehemently imply the futility of reform effort. No good can come, they reason, from presenting honest opinions to those whose stupidity, revealed in the chaos of social problems, will prevent their understanding. This attitude springs from a misconception of the function of thinkers in social reform. One need not engage in acrimonious debate to assert his ideas, as the lives of influential scientists testify. The motor of reform is thought, and verbal dispute merely one of many indications that the thought is making its way. Because good ideas, if they are offered, will ultimately prevail against bad ones, scientists should not hesitate to submit theirs. No matter how loudly the proponents of error may bellow, they will ultimately give way before an honest expositor of truth. As the unreasoned oratory of

the forum need not deter scientists from presenting their ideas, neither should the fear of indifference and inertia. No one who trusts thought can doubt that thinkers are able to devise a system of rules that will insure peace; but many can and do doubt that the remainder of society would accept their suggestion. An improvement in natural science need only run the gantlet of a limited number of thinking persons, but to progress in social science one must carry with him the entire superstitious, ignorant, drinking, fighting, insane world. The majority can never follow close reasoning and so, some believe, a thinking man has no place in social science. But, fortunately for humankind, those who do think lead the unthinking. Today's social problems, ridiculous as they are, but reflect the application of the ideas of the most respected social scientists. Those who develop new ideas need propagandize none but others who think. Not inertia, but a confusion and opposition of energy which simulates inertia, blocks reform. This confusion does not originate with the unlettered, but with the most learned leaders of thought, from whom it is transmitted to all people. Reformers today present a myriad of radically conflicting proposals to the public, so that the disputes unsettled by the original thinkers are duplicated on lower intellectual levels by followers. But if opinion were united, reformers would no longer counterbalance each other. Society's energy united would overcome any real inertia. What was called inertia would prove to have been energy in opposition. The history of changing government evidences men's insistence on organizing society after their ideas. Those who develop social ideas develop the future of society. The application of

reform ideas only waits upon intellectual unity.

Intellectual unity is what today's natural scientists, of all people, are most fitted to contribute. Today's leading social thinkers, whose confusion and disagreement guide today's legislation, have changed their ideas very little in adjustment to the latest destructive techniques. Natural scientists, relatively unsophisticated in the jargon of social science, but deep in the lore of scientific method, are more imaginative. They could lead social reform simply by arriving at a concerted opinion. This is not necessarily an undemocratic process. The enemies of thought and democracy have always been strengthened by the unity which their authoritarian philosophies prescribe, but it does not follow that democracies must never show united opinions. The very assumption by which democracy can operate is that the human ability to find truth will produce unity where none is dictated. When democracy fails to do so its problems go unsolved, and it is supplanted by authoritarian government. Democracy demands that ideas may differ, not that they must; social action demands that ideas be alike. The united opinion which guides democratic action is a reflection of the unity of truth, discovered by freely inquiring and energetic minds. Those who are now natural scientists are best qualified to discover this truth.

Indisposition to change, then, cannot in itself take the blame for society's failure to solve its problems. The normal demand for reform is adequate to force change, if it were only unified. But in addition to that normal demand today exists a

special demand, created by the very thing that makes reform so urgent, the atomic bomb. Its fascinating novelty and horrible potentialities have gripped the popular imagination, providing a crude shock that has prepared people for radical change. Never before could reformers be heard so readily. But not only for them is current popular psychology a unique opportunity. Aspiring dictators abound in every land. Their proposals, too, find a more ready audience among people excited by potential dangers. If thinkers of democracy can offer only confused intellectual controversy, their offering cannot compete with the simple slogans of groups bent on controlling a panicky public. Change is in the air, yes, but whether it is to be guided by fear and a tyrant, or reason and thinkers, is an issue yet undecided. The decision rests largely with the thinkers. If they decline their responsibility, the vacuum of social ideas will be filled by the mouthings of the psychopathic creatures in whom authority is vested when democracy has given up the struggle. The crisis of atomic weapons must be met quickly with cool, clear intelligence, or it will instead evoke the age old reaction to crisis: fearful delegation of sovereignty to military leaders.

As the scientists' object in studying society will be to prevent war, their approach should be oriented to that goal. The first consideration is: what causes war? More particularly it should be: what within human control causes war? The entire universe participates in causing human behavior, but only what is within human control is worth our considering. Other features of environment must be accepted as "given" in this problem, for we cannot affect

them. Taking the world and its inhabitants as they are, how can the latter prevent war? That is the problem.

Deterministic philosophy, which no one has the omniscience to prove or refute, asserts that nothing is within human control. However that may be, acts are controlled by the mind, even though no man knows what controls the mind. Granting this possible limitation of meaning, then, human acts are within human control, and conscious social acts such as war are within conscious social control. A popular notion has it that "geography" causes wars by placing political groups in positions of rivalry, such that they are inevitably "destined" to go to war. But while geographic position may influence the selection of particular opponents and allies in war, it does not affect the existence of war in general, unless by completely isolating the combatants. Many American cities have experienced, without war or the thought of war, enough rivalry from geographic position to "destine" an interminable series of European wars, but the rules of the common government under which they lived forestalled "destiny". If humans have any power over themselves, they have the power to prevent war, despite any seeming clash of interest caused by factors not in their control.

Human control in society is most effectively asserted through the rules of government. Reformers may work, and have worked by directly influencing behavior, instead of the rules by which behavior is channelled. The present exigencies of reform are such that energy expended in improving the rules of government will be far more effective than that expended in improving individual

character. This is not to imply that individual character is unimportant; it is, rather, the raw material of society. But individual character is already sufficiently, albeit imperfectly, developed. People want peace; they can associate peaceably under certain conditions. Their behavior is sufficiently civilized so that if it functioned within the framework of properly improved rules war would not recur. But if reformers concentrated their efforts on improving human character, they would discover that the present structure of governmental rules is so poor that no possible improvements in human character can alone prevent war. Just as social science is weak relative to natural, so is the art of ruling weak compared with human character. In improving this art the greatest good can be accomplished with the least effort.

The various spiritual proposals for improving individuals so as to prevent war are patently unworkable. A more practicable scheme to prevent war without changing the rules of government is that offered by the proponents of birth control. If war is, as it sometimes appears to be, the result of a struggle for room in an overcrowded world, birth control certainly would tend to prevent war. The idea that society can be improved by restricting population springs from the idea that war and poverty are caused by overcrowding the earth, and must stand or fall with the Malthusian doctrine it is designed to circumvent. Overcrowding is not a simple matter of the ratio of population to resources. It is relative also to the ability of the population to use the resources. A few thousand Indians felt crowded in America, lived poorly, and continually fought each other for hunting grounds.

Our modern civilization, with improved means of cooperation and of production, supports hundreds of times the Indian population without their feeling crowded. The absolute numbers of the population are, within wide limits, hardly a factor in the "psychological density" of population, which is more determined by productivity and cooperative ability. "Overcrowding" will be solved, therefore, by improving the latter two, not by restricting^{re-}production.

The job at hand is reduced, then, to an inquiry into legislation. The guide, "What within human control causes war", may be restated: "What legislation causes war?" The scope of investigation needs to be further reduced and specified by determining what war is. For the purpose of studying war causation, the most useful definition of war is one which pictures it as more than actual fighting, and includes as war all acts done in preparation for war. A prominent war historian has said that the systems of militarism and secret alliances were important causes of the first world war. Such knowledge is, for reformers, practically useless. The same influences that drive men to prepare for war drive them also to overt fighting. The preparations do not drive them to it, any more than the first battles cause those ensuing. The American Legion, on the other hand, thinks that preparation for war can prevent war. History shows it as mistaken as those who believe that failing to prepare for war can prevent war. Preparation is irrelevant. War comes whether one is prepared or not. That which must be dealt with is what inclines people to war. It is useless to know what brings the first attack once the

inclination to war is dominant.

It remains now only to discover the causative relationship of legislation to war, as defined. It has been said that a difference in the rule systems of two countries, and the ideologies behind them, may lead those two countries to war. True it is, as with geographical influences, that international similarities in rules, and related cultural and ideological characteristics, may influence the selection of particular allies and opponents in war, but not the occurrence of war in general. A mere difference cannot of itself cause war, and war might arise without any difference at all. The difference is not critical. Absolute, not relative, characteristics of government rules cause war. If the rules of one nation lead it to exploit and dominate its neighbors, a similarity of rule and custom in the neighbors will only increase the likelihood of war. But that one nation drives its autos on the right side, and another on the left, cannot in itself bring those two nations to war.

Absolute characteristics of government rules cause war. Can the characteristics be abstracted and ordered intelligibly? Human situations, it is often said, are so complex that they cannot be generalized. This is a misconception. Any natural situation is infinitely complex, but probably contains elements which are quite simple. If these are identified and labelled, their role may be analyzed. One has but to locate those elements in the situation which are useful in forwarding his investigation, and he may then analyze in simple terms. If physicists were not familiar with the concept of mass, and attempted a mechanics in

which color, shape and size were the criteria, that mechanics would be more confusing than modern economics. Because, in social science, this elementary preliminary to useful thought has been poorly accomplished, the body of existing knowledge is little related, hard to understand and to work with. That it is possible to find simple, useful concepts in social science is evidenced by the widespread comprehension and everyday use of the concept "exchange value". Further useful concepts could be defined and used, and many have been.

Such a concept may be found always associated with the legislation that causes wars. Rules, in order to provoke war, must be possessed of a certain characteristic. Just as an object must have mass, no matter what its other attributes, in order to exert gravity, so must legislation have a certain characteristic, no matter what else is involved, in order to bring war. What this is I shall show.

It will bring order to the data, and make the demonstration more convincing, to assemble the evidence in two stages. First, situations bringing war may be reduced to a convenient two generalities, and the role of legislation in causing war described. Second, the significant common characteristic of the legislation may be identified. Bridging the gap between evidence and abstract principle by the two generalities will more clearly demonstrate that the principle is derived from all the evidence than could be done by relating the principle to a few particular examples.

A survey of past wars reveals that the infinite variety of

situations which raise human belligerency to the fighting point will all fit one of two descriptions: either two sovereigns both claim authority over the same item; or else the internal living conditions in some sovereignty are objectionable, and war seems to offer relief. A study of how these situations arise, and what role legislation plays in them, will reveal the characteristic of legislation that causes war.

Disputed sovereignty over land* or over people, may cause war. Persons are the object of dispute whenever some sovereignty is objectionable to some of its actual or potential subjects. Wars of outright conquest, revolution and civil war all arise from disputes over the sovereignty of persons. The role of rules in causing such wars is essential. A sovereign's function is to make and administer rules. Objections to sovereignty are therefore objections to the de facto rules of the sovereign. The basis of objection is not just that the sovereign makes and enforces rules, for every society lives by some sort of enforced rules. But something exists in the rules of a sovereign who is resisted which the resisting group resent, but which the imposing group not only do not resent, but are even willing to fight to impose on others. Rules which cause such behavior must be discriminatory in some sense. Groups object to rules because the rules discriminate against them somehow, or discrimination is anticipated if they submit to the expanding sovereignty.

The range of possible discrimination is unlimited. The word

*Labor products, in this discussion, are included with land.

"discrimination" connotes particularly, in America, those rules restricting the opportunities of a biologically defined group, the negroes. But discrimination may operate against groups defined by any characteristic, and it may injure them in any number of different ways. A rule which discriminates in any sense whatever will define a group of people having the characteristic against which the rule discriminates, and give them good cause to object to the sovereignty that enforces the rule.

The victimized groups may be variously defined. The biggest wars are waged by geographically defined groups, but revolutions, strikes, and riots are fought by economically, culturally or biologically defined groups. The American Revolution, and our War between the States, were contests between more regionally defined groups, while more economically and socially defined groups were at odds in the Russian and French Revolutions. Not only may the groups be defined in different ways, but they may be alienated by no end of conceivable discrimination. They may be denied participation in the councils of sovereignty; be subjected to special taxes, and their economy otherwise ordered for the benefit of others; their religion and customs may be directed and interfered with after the opinions of the sovereign. These and many other common ways of discriminating provoke that smoldering resistance which is a form of war. Not only are the occasional concerted outbursts war, but all the endless opposition and resentment that must forever be downed by force.

Objectionable discrimination not only characterizes the rules of those frankly devoted to conquest, but of all nations.

Those who do not discriminate by design manage to do so by accident, incidentally to performing some other function of sovereignty. Incidental discrimination may be just as objectionable as tho it were conscious. It occurs because those who make the laws, tho well meaning, cannot cope with the problem of making rules that discriminate in no sense whatever. They believe that fairness to some groups, in some ways, is enough to keep the peace. The history of war proves that is not so. The ways in which laws are not discriminatory soften the hurt of the ways in which they are, and strengthen the sovereignty by increasing the numbers of its supporters, but they do not thereby turn aside all forceful opposition. An edict that all persons must contribute to a certain church in one sense treats all persons alike, but in another sense discriminates against unbelievers. A law indiscriminately requiring all persons to pay a tax when they grow cotton is fair in one sense, but in another discriminates against those who grow cotton. A rule need discriminate in only one sense to provoke the dissatisfaction that is quelled only by force.

Today's structure of rules discriminates in some sense from beginning to end. Most discrimination is not against small groups, but in favor of small groups at the expense of the majority. This is no less discrimination, and is no less provocative of war. Not only do the privileged groups fight each other; not only do the sum of the unprivileged fight the sum of the privileged; but, most important, the existence of the privilege makes impossible our peaceably uniting with other sovereignties. To do so we must ask those with whom we join to accept exploitation by the same privileged groups to whom we submit. Foreign nations' behavior

indicates that that sacrifice is no more attractive to them than submitting to the dictation of the Communist Party. Peaceful world union is impossible while legislation supports the existence of privileged groups. Whatever in rules of government causes war over the sovereignty of persons must be eradicated if war is to be prevented.

Sovereignties divide among themselves the land of the world, as well as the people. In apportioning it they make good their claims by warfare. Boundary disputes are only one cause of war, but war, on the other hand, is the only means by which boundaries are, or can be, determined. The present boundaries of all nations but reflect the course of past wars and negotiations based on threats of war*. The very nature of exclusive territorial possession makes this inevitable. The earth was not produced by any man, and no man's or nation's claim to own it can be based on anything but a discrimination in his favor. That is not the sort of thing to which the excluded people will voluntarily agree. Each generation assumes that the past wars which secured title to its land are forgotten in the dim annals of history, that title now rests on the secure base of occupation, unbesmirched with blood. The jealousy of excluded nations, thwarted only by superior power, shows that is not so. ~~Ownership~~ of territory is in discrimination against all the other peoples of the earth. Such is the national strength of the United States that the matter is brought less sharply to our attention than it is to the Poles over their corridor, the Turks over their ~~straight~~ strait, and the Egyptians

*Purchases, of course, are but transfers of a title based on war.

over their isthmus. But if Colombia were a major power we should be well aware of the force required to seize and hold Panama. And not only critical areas, but all areas are kept in national possession by force. As long as the rules of nations prescribe an exclusive national territoriality it will be so. Conflicting territorial claims as a cause of war are most plainly discernable in periods when rival sovereignties are expanding into unoccupied or defenseless lands. But with the original pre-emption the battles are not over. The decision is never final. What was taken by force is challenged by force, and will forever be challenged by force until a worldwide accord has accepted a system of worldwide landownership, and discrimination by exclusive territorial landownership no longer exists.

Sharply aggravating the war making potentialities of exclusive territoriality are trade barriers between nations. Trade reduces considerably the discriminatory effects of exclusive national landownership. Nomadic tribes, who do not trade, wage perpetual war over their grasslands, for occupancy by one group means absolute exclusion of all others. Trade considerably tempers the exclusion by permitting the excluded to enjoy in part the benefits of the territory. When nations erect trade barriers they voluntarily revert to the status of nomads. They take from others all possibility of peaceful access to the natural advantages which they have appropriated. Nations want to acquire land in part so that they may give its ownership to their citizens; trade cannot alleviate their disappointment if they fail. But They also want land because a larger trade area permits greater trade,

and more of all the advantages that go with trade. Thru international trade nations can acquire that increased trading area without increasing their territories. But when international legislative barriers block trade expansion, each nation can enjoy the advantages of trade only by establishing sovereignty over greater territories. Exclusive national landownership, in a world of international trade barriers, is a standing invitation to aggressive war.

The boundary settlements effected by the recent war will be no less provocative of war than any previous. From the defeated, stripped of their conquests and surrounded by trade barriers, the loudest objections will be forthcoming. But even the victors, disputing the spoils, might begin the next war. If they, who have so much, will even consider fighting to get more, the vanquished may be expected to recommence the battle whenever opportunity arises. Nothing in the present arrangements can make the conquered nations more content with their lot than they were after the first world war. To maintain the peace terms we have imposed will require the continued application of force.

An influential intellectual current has maintained that if boundaries could be peacefully negotiated they would not provoke war. But negotiation is only a peaceful estimate of the fight the parties could put up if they had to. The decision is reached according to no other consideration. On what other basis, indeed, should boundaries be drawn? What claim to exclusive national landownership rests on anything more plausible? The self-determination of the occupants is no less forceful a basis, for their occupation was achieved by war; purchase, as of Alaska, gives a claim no better

than the seller's; exploration, as of the Antarctic, carried with it no international concession of ownership. Negotiation is only the peaceful reconciliation of war potential, hence very close to war itself. It is not a substitute for, but an auxiliary of, war.

If there were no rules, then warfare would be entirely over the occupation of land. But it does not follow that rules play no part in creating the situation that provokes international war over landownership today. The rules of governments have been written so as to duplicate among nations the struggle for survival that exists among unsocial organisms. Rules therefore play a vital role in causing wars over the division of land. The rule system that scientists devise to prevent war must posit undiscriminatory equal ownership of the earth, for all individuals of all nations. If not, then it, too, will be some day challenged by the force of the excluded.

Disputes over sovereignty, while often sufficient in themselves to explain a war, do not begin to reveal why people are as warlike as they are. Oftimes issues of sovereignty seem mere excuses for a people that is determined, for other reasons, to go to war. Were people contented with peace, they would look much farther than they do for issues of sovereignty great enough to fight over. We

✓ infer from a man's foul disposition an unhappy home; a nation's belligerence may have the same cause. The most effective causes of war operate within national boundaries, not at them. When the desires of individuals are thwarted in peace, they look for opportunity in war. Unemployment and discontent are precursors of aggression. The second situation leading to war, then, is that in which peace has become unendurable, and war seems to offer relief.

In countries of "capitalist" economy war puts purchasing power into the hands of consumers, of one sort or another, and thereby temporarily resolves the dilemma of modern economics. It puts men to work at high wages, and destroys enough wealth so they will be busy replacing it for many years. After the war, the victorious nation may further stimulate its economy by expanding into the vacuum left by its victim. Under these circumstances the opponents of war are hard put to it indeed.

Communist nations also benefit from war. They must always maintain a high spirit and loyalty behind an unpleasant, omnipresent, inquisitorial government; war instills in citizens the religious fanaticism that will meet the demands of totalitarian government. Not only communist, but all governments are strengthened by this effect of war. Government personnel, however, are not peculiarly at fault. If politicians do not lead their unsatisfied clients to an international war, what then? Rival politicians will overthrow them. When the people will have blood, woe be to him who stands in the way.

This cause of war will only cease to operate when society is governed by a system of rules that will assure to every one the opportunity to produce, and to enjoy the full product of his labor free from exploitation, or objectionable restraint and dictation. Neither socialism, communism, nor capitalism, as presently conceived, offers such a possibility. But as unwise legislation is an essential determinant of living conditions in all countries, wise legislation can preclude this cause of war.

A nation's economy may be objectionable because of its own foolish rules, or it may find its economy ruined by the legis-

lation of other nations. Whichever cause is predominant, the ruin will lead to war. The rules that can injure a foreign country are those which affect international trade. Nations become dependent on others when they engage in international trade. In feudal days nations occupying the same land as today's, and going perhaps by the same name, subsisted with little trade. But today's nations are not the same nations. They are much more populous than their medieval predecessors, and accustomed to far higher material standards of consumption. The recent increment of population, and the improved material standards, were made possible by increased productivity. Modern high productivity, in turn, depends on extensive trade. With trade, cooperation and specialization permit a production to whose possible increase we cannot see the end. Since population depends on modern production, and modern production depends on trade, any nation with extensive international trade is relying on other nations for the very existence of some of its population.

Some countries, such as our own, are not vitally dependent on trade with others. We would not find our resources too small for our population were foreign trade denied us, tho that denial would bring us great inconvenience. But trade restrictions have disastrous effects on nations whose international trade is more important to them. When the bull of protectionism rumbles into this china-shop of interdependent nations, the earth is strewn with economic wreckage. Those whose trade is disrupted must divert their productive resources into less profitable channels, taking great loss, and reducing their productivity. If their dependence on foreign trade is great, and their material standards already

low, some of their population may have to be liquidated. Although it is true that the victims of trade barriers could improve their own legislation so greatly that that of others could not affect them so tragically, but of course the fact is they will not. Neither will they exterminate part of their population. Instead they will go to war.

When a country is victimized by international trade barriers, it is compelled to face the problems of autarky. If it cannot live with international trade, it must live without it. A successful autarky requires that under one sovereignty be gathered as many resources and as much population as is necessary to comprise an efficient exchange economy. Since efficiency increases indefinitely with population and resources, and human desires for efficient production have no visible limit, autarkical nations expand until they are stopped by force. Most small nations of the world have already reached the greatest expansion their power can achieve. For them, autarky means either returning to a primitive agricultural economy, with great loss and hardship, or attaching themselves as satellites to a powerful neighbor who will trade with them in return for political control. But a few small nations were before the recent war powerful enough to attempt solving the problem of autarky by expanding. They were encouraged by the feeling within small nations that union would be desirable for them, also. Germany, Italy and Japan were adjusted to foreign trade, and could not change to autarky without great hardship. In the depression of the 1930s, a wave of protectionist spirit swept the world, and struck particularly telling blows at the internationally oriented economies of those countries. These Axis powers sought relief in expansion,

bringing on the great war recently ended. Their defeat does not end the efficacy of this cause of war, altho it reduces by three the number of powerful nations able to effectively resent discriminatory international trade barriers. The empires of other western European nations are drifting away, and are in many instances only kept by perpetual petty warfare. Only Russia and the United States are at all invulnerable to the trade barriers that stupidity will erect in the next depression. At that time the other nations of the world will feel a strong impetus to expand, in which process they will encounter each other in every direction. The peoples of the earth, instead of peacefully cooperating, will be split into competing autarkic-al units, each trying to extend its sway over the entire globe.

Legislative international trade barriers obviously are essential to cause war by this method. In no other war cause is the vital role of legislation so patent. Legislation also figures in causing war by the other ways discussed. It offends people so that they dispute the authority of sovereignty over them; it creates a system of international land tenure that assumes war as the determinant of ownership; it causes the discontent with peace that drives men to war; and now we see it also chokes off the vital trade of foreign nations. If disputed sovereignty over land or over people brings the war, or if the war originates in a people's discontent, rules of government are essential parts of the wars' cause. Preventing war is a job no greater than improving legislation.

A great convenience would be available to synthetic social science if, from the foregoing analysis, one common characteristic of the legislation that causes war could be identified, that

is found in no other legislation. The characteristic, whatever it is, is the legislative cause of war. A rule system under which people are to live in peace must contain no rules with this characteristic. Discrimination is common to all the rules that provoke war. Where sovereignty over persons is disputed, discriminatory legislation is the cause; where sovereignty over land is contested, discriminatory national landownership is to blame; where international trade blockades turn starving nations to war, discriminatory tariff rules are responsible. I will not pretend to prove in a few words that the rules which promote domestic discontent are the discriminatory ones alone, but I am convinced that it is so. Those rules which admit some and exclude others without adjustment or compensation; which take from one and give to another for no service; which submit one to the will of another without consent: these cause the discontent that breaks out in war.

Discrimination is the legislative cause of war. War prevention demands that non-discriminatory rules replace the present ones. This is no small requirement. Such is the magnitude, and intrenched position of discrimination that no superficial changes in rules will prevent another war. Radical thought and action in the near future can accomplish that, and nothing less will avail. Existing rules cause war; war is suicide; the alternative to change is therefore destruction. In the past, dissatisfied with the results of legislation, people have amended, when they should have replaced, the basic rules of the land. This procedure will prove as ineffective in forestalling the impending war as it has in effecting social reform. Drastic problems call for drastic

solutions. Whoever is shocked by the enormity of radical change, let him consider the alternatives and decide if any will shock him less. If not change, what then? Extermination? The discrimination I have condemned is not just a possible cause of war, it is an inevitable cause of war. Let him who resents being exhorted remember that his life, too, is at stake; his future, too, is prejudiced by the discriminatory rules that set men against one another. His best interest, no matter what fancied benefits he may derive from discriminatory rules, is to join with those who would prevent war by reasoned legislative change.

It is for scientists to lay the intellectual groundwork for the change. The rules which they devise must be as equitable as human ingenuity can arrange. They must delegate special favors or handicaps to no group; arrange a common ownership of the earth; assure productive opportunity to all persons; and not lightly disregard the interests of other nations. To harmoniously combine these requirements in a code of law, to achieve intellectual unity in its support, and to apply it in time is the task before us. No less will avert the impending war.

Unfortunately, the requirement that rules discriminate in no sense cannot be fulfilled. Rules that avoid discriminating in many ways may be constructed, but to discriminate in absolutely no sense whatever is virtually impossible. To discriminate in one sense a rule need only be in accord with the ideas of one person and at odds with another's, tho it treat them alike in all other senses. This is not mere quibbling. Violence has proceeded from just such nonsense. Not only can intelligent persons radically

disagree, but a fringe of psychic misfits may object to anything. Tho the most equitable legislation be devised, no hope can be entertained of avoiding the disapproval of many. The rules of government must therefore be always supported by force.

Society is not thereby doomed to eternal warfare. Opposition to its rules may be minimized by making them as equitable as human ingenuity is able. When valid objections have thus been precluded, only the demented will have to be compelled. If such anti-social persons could wage atomic war against the rest of us, that war would indeed be inevitable. Fortunately, they can not. The very characteristics which define them render them incapable of the cooperation ~~with~~ warfare demands. Only when its rules alienate reasonable people need society fear the consequences.

The discrimination that is inevitable is that which is necessary to avoid even greater discrimination. Discrimination against thieves, murderers, or lawbreakers are examples. Such discrimination is desirable, not because it does not provoke war, but because it provokes war against human characteristic with which society intends to be always at war. It prevents the greater discrimination that would result from failing to wage war on thieves, murderers, and lawbreakers.

A more subtle sense in which discrimination is desirable may be labelled "compensatory discrimination". The deferred payments found in exchange economies create situations in which only one half an exchange occurs at one time, the second half being tied to the first by an enforceable contract. The two halves together

obviously make up an equitable whole, yet each taken separately is discriminatory, the two cancelling one another. It often occurs that, where some intricacy of the economy conceals one half an exchange, the compensatory half will be condemned as discriminatory. In a narrow sense it is, and this is sometimes enough to provoke violence. Such violence cannot be avoided by stopping the discrimination, for the alternative to this compensatory discrimination is a discrimination in sum which is even less equitable.

That discrimination is unavoidable does not mean its avoidance is no longer a useful criterion for rules, however. The criterion need only be modified, not destroyed. Discrimination which is compensatory may be distinguished from that which is not. Discrimination in sum should be avoided, while compensatory discrimination, being necessary to avoid discrimination in sum, should be used wherever necessary.

Deciding, of a particular rule, whether it is totally discriminatory or merely the compensatory half of an equitable whole may often involve more complexities than does the relatively straightforward example above. That is one reason legislators have so frequently erred, and why good as well as bad rules have sometimes been resented. But avoiding discrimination in sum is the most that human ingenuity can accomplish. When that is done, whoever chooses to fight society must be forcefully subjected and, ultimately, either persuaded or liquidated. Fortunately, those who will fight compensatory discrimination are in general only those incapable of cooperating with each other

to threaten society.

The grand intellectual preparation which complete reform requires may prove too much to accomplish in time to avert the impending war. But one part of the reform demands no such preparation, and would postpone war for many years. That is free trade. Free trade can be effected without the long preliminary of devising new rules, by the purely destructive thought and action involved in tearing down trade barriers. Free trade will temporarily check our economic dilemma by permitting a great expansion; increase our friendly contacts with the nations of the world; create an economic interdependence that will discourage war; relieve the pressure for expansion in small nations; and alleviate the discrimination of exclusive national landownership. It will be the first step towards complete reform, and will increase the peacetime available to prepare for that reform. But free trade will not prevent war forever. It will block one of four ways by which war comes, and somewhat obstruct the other three. But the three will still remain open until we fundamentally change the rules of government.

Ultimately, what will be the method of world union? Under our present rule systems we and the Russians cannot peaceably unite. Our system supports monopolies by which we cannot ask the Russians to be exploited, and they cannot ask us to submit to their dictator. The repercussions of these facts in recurrent clashes between ourselves and Russia have brought pessimism, and well they may, to those who visualize a world of no drastic changes. Even should the Russians adopt our form of government, their monopolies would clash with ours. Should we adopt their

form, our dictator could not peacefully submit to theirs, nor theirs to ours.

“ “ Fortunately man is gifted with the power to change his mind. Governments are built according to man's ideas. If his mind never changed, then natural selection among governments could operate only by war. Individual organisms must fight to live as they are. Governments, brought into the world by thought, can be peacefully put aside when thoughts change. Man has the power of intellectual selection. In this lies the hope of peaceful world union.

Neither of our present governments can peacefully expand. But a new rule system, perfected by honest thought, can be so far superior to what we know at present that not only will the country of its origin accept it, but all countries will study the successful example and follow. Once all the nations have adopted a workable undiscriminatory rule system, they will merge their governments with little friction. On a basis of successful radical reform, then, peaceful world union is possible.

It is for us to improve the legislation of the United States. That drastic change may be effected by a people's conscious effort has been shown many times in such upheavals as the Russian and French revolutions. What remains to be shown is that such changes can occur other than catastrophically: that the anticipation of catastrophe may be as efficient as catastrophe itself in driving humans to change. I think our species is capable of adjusting. I call upon all thinking persons to begin the adjustment that will prevent disaster. I call upon you to become obsessed with improving the rules of government, lest a monstrous war destroy us.