AELOS - Ideas

Title

~~Farm Size +~~ Paragons of Productivity, or Stores of Wealth?
Large Farms: ~~Efficient Units~~, or ~~Land Reserves~~?
New Light from aELOS.

Production Dynamo or Land Freeze

Counting Timber as Land wd. bias to ~~of~~ overvalue large "farms". Do they, tho?

Complement or Subst. for K

Rice needs few bldgs, much land.

Reclaimed swampland: ~~the~~ few bldgs.
Bottom land " "

Land w/o Bldgs

✓ Large Farms: ~~on~~ Land w/o Bldgs.

Land Quality, Farm Size, & Land/Bldg. Ratios: a New View from OELOS' aerie.

Outline,

Rich Lands & Poor Bldgs: New Data from Light

Large Farms on Land-w/o-Bldgs: New ~~Light~~ Data from CAELOS Data, 1988

~~Large Landholdings & Low Capacity~~ (LLLC)

I. Major findings

II Rising Concn.

A. Why of concern,

Crime, death rates - cite Popper

Equity Progressivity of tax system

Effic.

Nat. self-image; change nat. character.

Need to explain why it happens.

Instl. bias: tax, price support, -Δ y block rates,

Loss of employmt., direct & indirect. Safety-valve.

Death of Farm Towns. / BE Rhodes, p. 45

~~B~~. Politics: (cite Elw. Mead, Magnus Berrick re grand manner of wheat & cattle vs ranchers.)

Produn: world leader; need to export.

Tax policy: prop., inc., v.a., payroll.

B. Defn. & instrmt.

1. Mean ~~or~~ & ~~LCR~~ dispersion.

Both are imptnt., but mean alone contains large arbitrary element, depends on cutoff in defin; small farms; treatment of part time farms.

The Concn. less affected by this, bcs. rate of Δ of size continues up entire Lorenz curve. E.g. top 10%, Taken alone, also has LCR comp. to whole.

~~2~~. History, vis-à-vis disp. bias often bn. ~~contrd~~ accompanied by falling or const. mean. Focus on mean has concealed imptnt. changes. - ~~bn. blinded~~ blinded many observers to imptnt. changes.

We will ~~use~~ use dispersion msres. mainly. "Concn." means hi dispersion around mean.

2. Msres. of dispersion.

Standard msre. is LRR (GC). Ours too, but for some purposes any msre will do — e.g. O'Conn's regn. fallacy.

3. Msres of size.

Area. Suits from 1900, value of hist. continuity. But obvious shortcomings. ~~Major contrib~~. Widely believed ~~of~~ ~~states~~ concn., ∨ Findings of this paper, it may not. esply for whole U.S.

Sales, N.G., bcs. hi turnover ~~of other~~ inflates downstream ~~contain~~ firms ~~back~~ big, cfd. to upstream. VA or ~~profits~~ better, but n.a. Profit w.s.; ~~depends~~ fluctn w. degree of debt-financing, vacation).

Asset value. - msre of potential or capacity. New data divides L + B. Our effort to see how their ratio shifts w. size.

C. LCR by msre, 1900 - now.

D. Causes of risj concentration.

Are 2 ~~re~~ contrasting hypotheses of risj concn of land w/o bldgs: ecs of scale; v concn. of wealth, merger mania.

mkt. failure. annalgam of

~~bad~~ 3d-world land-hoarding, hedge vs. inflm, tax shelter. Cite Veblen; E. Mead; F. Norris; Clawson + Wilson.

Habit of Am. ecstrs. is to see effic. at home; mkt. failure in LDCs. Some see both at home: Tiananmen; H.G. (Canvas; congested frontiers)

Fate of BAE suggests ~~this~~ weeding-out of 2nd kind

Not my purpose to settle this issue.

Rather, whichever is rt., make case for tax; fms land more heavily than bldgs.

If (1) is rt., then large fms w/o bldgs are very large taxable surplus

If (2) is rt; then large fms w/o bldgs are freezing up good land: tax will induce better use.

MF:l

Intro. New data from AELOS.

I. Major Findings (summarized)

A. Land/bldg ratio rises w. size of farm.

B. Land/labor ratio rises w. size, more than previously msrd.

C. Land/bldg ratio ~~vi tot~~ varies among states & regions

D. Concn. msrd. by L.V. ~~may exceed~~ is comparable to same as msrd. by area

a. Common belief to contrary based on regn. fallacy

b. The looser the correl., the stronger the fallacy.

This correlation is loose (ac/fm & value/fm)

c. Need to purify data, purge of vf, before concluding.

d. Also need to msre L & B separately. Common basis ~~understates~~ overstates L/ac. of ~~larger~~ smaller fms. by usig L & B as msre of LV. B are smaller share on larger fms, thus o'stating drop off of L/ac w. size.

E. ~~In~~ Among non-ranching states, LV conc > acre conc.

" urban " " > "

~~In~~ " ranching " " < "

For all states " > "

but effect is dim. by combining ranching w. other states

For all non-ranching states, " ? "

≠ Ariz. is an "arid" but not a ranching state bec so much irrn. Might call the class "grazing - dry farm" states.

F. ~~Synthetically~~ divi. divis. line-straddling strata strengthens ~~above effects~~. conc. by value,

~~gives a clue how vot~~ Suggests they ~~wd. be~~ are much stronger, to be shown by ranking indiv. farm data.

G. Urban Strata.

Major points very strong among these 7.

Stronger yet when divide Md + NH in 2 parts @. If half of Md. is like W. Va

Purposes

Farm Size, Land Quality, & Land/Building Ratios.

Purposes:

Msre concn. in u.s. fmg.

Use major available msres to identify forces promoting & checking concn.

Antic. incidence (or impact) of diff. kinds of taxes & tax bases by size of fm. - esp. prop. taxes, & inc. taxes on fm. inc. (note large no. w. neg. profits; & lo ratio of govt. pmts to net inc.)

F2 Concn. is not an illusion.

A. Tendency to minimize.
1. "Turn rate" 11%.
2. Low value of lii acreages.
3. Big holdings, big families. Studies of man/land ratios indicate reverse.
4. Corps. are mostly families.
5. Fn. owners rare.

B. Rank by Sales - higher GR, ≠ 80 Turnover bias, but this makes large accs. smaller.

C. ~~B~~. Rank by L + B

1. Is lower, but still lii.
2. Is not ranked L, hence not comparable. Biases GR downwards, bcs. $\frac{L}{L+B}$ rises w. accs.
4. ⓐ, IV (O-ops only). ≠ 1900-40 data for all farms.
B much less concd. AELOS T.70, GR = .186 for B vs. .490 for L.
Cens. L includes more than strict L: other fm.
K like fences. These probably act like B
Landlord $\frac{L}{L+B}$ a value omitted ~~out~~, to .99! - 5, ⓛ.
3. Several counter indicns. ← For pure L, see landlord (over)

a. T. 51, p. 84, sales/ac drop slower than L + B/ac. (Even tho work/ac & turnover drop)

b. Crop data, most yields ∝ accs/fm. (All but wheat, ____?). Most likely reasons: better land.

≠ Adding landlord accts might reinforce, bcs. much higher $\frac{L}{L+B}$ — rented land is 90% L

data. 89% is L.

	L + B	Acs.
Owned	.62	.52
Rented Out	.54	.44

Shows dual effects:
Ownership conc. > opj conc.
Absence of bldgs.

$\frac{L}{L+B} + \frac{L+B}{ac}$ both rise w. acs/fm. 5.(2)

c. Share irrd. rises w. accs/fm. (3, a) (Careful!)
GR = .82

Crop data, % irrd. rises w. accs/fm. — all but sorghum & beans. Intra crop

2. d. % of land hvstd. for crops — rises w. accs/fm? 3, (g), II. Check vs. T. 8, p. 16.

e. Reprise
For landlords, $\frac{L+B}{ac}$ rises w. accs? 5, (c).
$\frac{L}{L+B}$ rises w. accs.
GR by L+B owned = .62; by accs, .52. Signif. bcs. is pure land

f. Intercrop cfsons.
Several crops above $\bar{x}$ both in accs/fm & $\frac{L}{ac}$, Rice, sugar (beets + cane), potos, ctn. (Rice, ~~tobacco~~ & ctn are in % land.)
Cash grain vs. hogs, silage (+ probly dairy). GR higher. (In spite of its % of land under lease.) Ctn. also in.
Other hand, range cattle vs. crops — is main factor op's inversely.
~~For~~ Timber land, too, wd. op. inversely, if msrd. site value w/o timber. Inconsistent tot'nt, timber vs. cattle.

F ~~#~~ Timber is stored up rent. If so, so is range cattle. Callin, range cattle land, or timber K, wd. change things.

g. In several states. $\frac{L}{ac}$ rises w. $\frac{ac}{Fm}$.
List, from 1940 Cens.
Try 87 Cens. $\frac{L+B}{Fm}$, by State.
"Hamman effect." 3d world pattern.

h. Interstate flows.
Refer ahead, to $\frac{L}{L+B}$ study, for rationale.
Effect of dividing 5 states. 6, (F).
" " " 2 small urban states.
States w. hi $\frac{L}{ac}$ have hi GR: FL, Ca, HI, AZ

i. Ky data
a. Miss. Delta
b. Indiana
c. Other?
Can go either way
d. L n. a.
e. Hamman. (Changed today)
Ky cties
f. Soil data wd. be better.
River Hills vs. Bottoms

Outline: Using ÆLOS
Talk at Shoreham Hotel

1. Debt to G.W., J.B., et al. 1988, 1st census to break of B+L. First great advance since 1900, Lorenz data. Of special interest to RSE.

2. Background of 1900
1880 Census, F.W. uses means.
H.G. writes March of Comm., wants freq. distribn.
Bitter debate: FW embarrassed.

3. Diff. regional backgrounds. FW sincere. Took his licking like a man, later acknowledged some merit. Probly was caught o' generalizing from his region.
H.G. had observed untold villainies, attempt of Robber Barons to set up a junker class, 1877, Desert Land Act.
We will see this pattern still holds.

4. From 1900, Lorenz data. Unbroken Δ in LCR
Many problems w. data
a. Ranked by area, not value
This has led to ~~comm~~ belief the data o'state degree of comm. Is even common among econs. Even heard in this room! Regression Fallacy.
Is an error, I will show. (Danish Census shows it.)

b. Bldgs not broken out separately from land.
This has allowed belief to flourish that median

farmers have a peculiar interest in opposing exemptions of bldgs. from prop. tax, a peculiar interest in avoiding shift of burden from bldgs. to land.

The "belief in the belief" has fostered the belief. G.B. Commons believed it, even in the state where it is least true.

P.L. Prentice believed it.

~~Also~~ This has not prevented some farm jurisdictions from pioneering in the policy. N.D. influenced Non-Partisan League. S.D.'s of Cal., Wright Act, from 1909.

Now for 1st time, we can test these beliefs vs. facts. (to the extent Census data correspond w. facts.)

Same time, Cens. Has reported on pmt: T+M, livestock, perhaps inventories. So, if you wondered how big farms shifted from small, rolling stock + livestock go w. big spreads. You look + say "Ah, these are innovators, the progressive farms, Turnip Townsends of our age."

Also note, they use much less labor/land. They sub. K for labor, "The Am. Way."

When we look at bldgs., will see they are not subbing all kinds of K for labor, only pmt. props. - mcubles. They are deficient in bldgs.

Cause for concern. Bldgs. used for storing; storing is conserving. Harvestore e.g.

Major, inc. tax shelters help mcubles. Also, exempt from prop.

tax, increasingly. (Farms do have a special situ. in this: trees, too.)
Many Georgeists have supported & applauded this - an error. K on wheels is no better than K affixed to ground.

c. Not enough data by county, e.d., etc.

d. Ownership

e. Hard to find what you want. Many headings look alike. as Hard as Wash. Metro Subway.

f. No use computer power. Findings nearly obscured. Think what creative researchers cd. do w. the raw data!
Same as BPL - 95% of data never used. Put your res. there.

5. What can we do w. data as published?

A. Rank by area, cf. L & B
T. 70, p. 229, findings shown by arrow.
From .37 up to .87. Surprising. Census didn't show ratios.
We cd. stop here, case closed. Land tax w/o bldg. tax is highly progressive. ~~Fns~~ Fns. are highly heterogeneous. Wd. encourage subdiv., supposed goal of nat. policy for 200 yrs. - & colonial policy for 180 yrs more.

B. Problem of regression fallacy.
Fly in ointment: farms are ranked by a measure of land: area. Creates a considerable bias. Not as much as if ranked by size by L.V.; but still, a lot. Cf., e.g., how diff. results wd. be if we defined farm size as s.f. of floor.

2nd problem: as areas get very different, people start thinking of big + small as being in diff. indies: range cattle vs. Truck farming.

C. Show regn. full, on board. Envelope of points, egg-shaped.

D. Solutions - Census has not provided. Very disappointing. But then, that is purpose of this conference.

1. Rank by L + B, report on L + B.

(Better yet, rank by L + B + Psyl.) Census precludes, hides data on individ. farms. So easy for them, push a button.

2. Cf. dispersions of L + B. The one w. higher dispersion rises faster as they rise together. Again, Census hides necy. individ. data.

3. Group by some other class, cf. the classes. This we can do, + will.

a. Race shd. work, but doesn't. 99% are white. Blacks do have smaller farms.

"Spanish" have larger.

"Asians" have "

I have no feel for who these people are, how defined, what they do, or where.

b. ~~Age~~ When acquired.

c. Ages

d. State. I chose this. Move

groups; less unequal in size. Prelim. dip, W.V. vs. Ia. showed greater differentiation, leading to clearer results.

E. Findings.

Findings - Outline

Concn. of Farm Land, w. Implications for Tax & Price Support Policy

Findings
0. Farm Land is main fun. asset.
1. Concn. ~~is rising~~ continues its long rise

✓ 2. Concn is not a pasture-land illusion

3. Land is more concd than bldgs. (+ workers)

✓ 4. Tot. opns. tend toward mean sizes – opns. less conc. than o'ship.

✓ 5. Concn. assd. w. low prop. taxes.

0. Fm. Land is major fm. asset

A. ~~L+B~~ are 79% of fm. assets. M+E = 9.8%.

~~Law Schultz et al. — see NRJ article.~~ Other extreme, idea that r.e. tax bears ~~on~~ fmrs. ~~Explanations for scale etc. must lie in land not~~ : dog wags tail.

~~B.~~ $\frac{L}{L+B} = ?$

L o'stated, includes much K. Soil maps show underlying ~~soil~~ land basis.

Is not implied ratio is diff. in cities.

Is not implied ratio is stable. Ramp.

~~Is not implied fmrs. own it all.~~ See AE-105.

(4), (5). Landlords, creditors. (Debt by size?)

Landlords & creditors focus on best land. ~~Land of lit P/c. Suburban land.~~ ~~(Cook Cty, v. Champaign Cty.)~~ ~~Marin vs. Yolo; orange v. Kings, etc.~~

Ratio varies widely. Intra-ag. diffs. are ~~more~~ greater than ~~fmrs~~ ag-urban diffs: among crops, states, cities, soils, locations, & size of holding.

tenures

E. "Sports" - ~~All~~ ND + DE, need ~~study~~ explaining. ND exempts bldgs.

F. ~~To the extent that~~ If big prop. tax ~~has effect~~, is of assoc. phenom., its effect is not ~~to~~ so much to hinder bldgs as ~~promote~~ ~~land~~ agglomeration.

~~G.~~ T.v. falls w. size, does not show regress. ass., but big firms are in low tax states. May be a true-enclave effect. Also among cities (where is well-known, e.g. ~~Kennedy~~ City TX; N. Me., ~~&~~ most ~~&~~ mid. forests.)

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when include family labor

Land/worker ratio also rises w. size of firm, - from older data. Current data no longer record this.
We can assume family labor & housing. ~~other~~

Only ~~beef~~ breeding cattle keep up w. size of firm. (in some areas). Timber may too. ~~Life~~ (Both are geogenic, but timber treated as land, cattle as K!) ~~So now~~

M & E keeps up more than B, less than cattle.

Census defn. of L is too broad, includes much K. Probably L B ~ then, could add 50% to value of B, get a much higher Gini R. for remaining L!

4. ~~Landlord holdings more conc. than taste-opns.~~
Tast. opns. tend toward mean sizes.
Landlord holdings more dispersed.
There are more landlords, but not many + that is 2dry.
Mis interpn. is to picture tasts. as piecing together opt. sizes typical
from many small landlords.

~~Facts, pulled~~ Totality of facts rather fits this generalize: o/p. units tend to extremes; o/s units to middle sizes.

That supported by o-opns. — more dispersed than pure opns w/o ownership (state).

✓ Together w. (3), this confirms that forces of concn. are in land mkt. Together w. interstate prop. tax shows supports deconc/ effect of prop. tax.

5. ~~Land/worker ratio~~

Relate t.r. to

Gini Coeff.

I. Use ~~of~~ several examples of dividing states, rather than doing it all; also, cite others who have done so.

Begin w. Mo. Hamman; Kruschopf. Mention river wills, too.

Indiana, Benton Cty vs. Elkhart
Wis., Minn, Mich, n. + s.
→ Benton is like IL; Elkhart like Ohio - divide IN e-w.
Plains states.

Cal: Irvine, Newhall, O'Neil, et al. Imp. V. 160 ac. fight. Villanis
SE: coastal plain vs piedmont vs. Appalachicam. (FL v. WV)
& Miss., delta vs. uplands.

II. Same areas w. larger o-op. fms. also have more ~~stuff~~ stuff, learning.

Ideas. My Paper. Moreham Conf.

1. Farm land, highly variable.

2. Commons, Prentice, dismiss it all.

3. Tradition of coddling
   a. Industries; negative taxes; (shelter)
   b. Subsidizing,
      i. Price supports. Quotas
      ii. X-subsidy
          Roads
          Water
          Power
          Postal
      iii. Consn. purch.
      iv. Farm Credit.
      v. Emerg. Relief

4. Coddling:
   a. Δ rent
   b. Δ scale

5. Pwr. warning.

6. Cf. hist. of nations that taxed agr. to yield surplus Japan. (not ~~Fr~~ Eg.) Or capped farm prices.

7. Use of land for prodn. control.

8. Boom + bust, a la Ramp
Not in cost of bldg. from bldgs., fences, etc.
Must be land.

9. 10 yr. data is too little.
LV rise by 500%, then drop by 60%.

10. Higher savings on better land – a change from old patterns? Why?

2 ##. 1880 - 1929, Georgists discovered urban l.v., (while others were sleeping, calling them Ricardian, etc.)
Rode that crest.
1960 – fad of "urban ecs." New tendency to dismiss farm land, RSC called "urbanoid."
LILP is highly so.

9. How valid is owner's self-statement of l.v. in a changing mkt?
a. Value to him?
b. Mkt value?
c. Floortage? – How treated?
d. Hist. cost?
e. "2 $5,000 cats"
f. Land-resid. or bldg-resid?
g. Capd. inc?
h. Validity of urban influence?

11. ~~FF~~. Effects of use-value assmt.
(Choice!)

12. "70% of farm assets are land + bldgs." – G.W.
a. Includes residences – not same as other indices.
b. Includes non farm influences on l.v.
- Minerals. Unusually hi share, bcs. of area involved
- Standing timber
- W+r.
- Rural. community, other than urban
- Urban potential: Rus in Urbe

c. May understate prod
- Livestock
- M+E
- Stores of feed: Hay, silage
- Standing crops, fruit

d. Hi share in space-inflated items
- fencing
- farm roads
- vehicles + aircraft
- horses

13. Concn. of ~~land~~ ownership vs. ~~titles~~ opns
    a. Wilson & Clemson
    b. Veblen
    c. My chap. 3
    d. Lenders who foreclose
    e. Concn. of liens, fncl
        a few big lenders
    f. Concn. of equities
        ~~A lot of~~ new, young buyers, on 2nd rung of
    eg. ladder, have little equity, be smaller than look.
        Tenneco et al. may have a lot.

    g. Monopsony control by middlemen.
    h. If mean ownership < mean opn. that says nothing re concn, LCR.

14. Importance of Info. Forces against full disclosure
    a. Eng. fight vs. valuation
    b. Fellmeth chap. on "Who does not know."
    c. Disguised ownership
        - To pose as foreign owner
        - To avoid 160 ac. law. Villarejo
        - To qualify for more price support?
            Secrecy of PMS records.
        - Re ACP prints?
    d. Mineral prospecting.

15. Turnover

a. Turnover is not "land reform".

- Concn. rises
- Many old baronies are stable - see list in Whose Water, add oil cos., names from Fellmeth.
- Recentering, reshuffling concn: ≠

ICCLC becomes Tenneco
Belridge Oil becomes Shell
So Cal acquires Gulf
Tex. acquires Getty.
Castle & Cook acquires Del Monte ?

- Selling "income" like on stock mkt., by absentees, not useful

b. Gross turnover >> net changes

c. Stock exchanges inflate spurious turnover

d. Inheritance is not turnover.

e. Taxes slow turnover

- Reassmt.
- Step up at death.

f. Smaller, cheaper parcels turn faster

g. Change form of orgn., e.g., incorp.

h. Rural d.u. parcels may be most of change

i. 3.5% of rural land ~~was~~ is "xfrd" per yr., but only 2% is voluntary xfr. by sale, p. 6, & <2% of ag. land.

≠ Horowitz acquires CZ, etc.

16. ~~Reprogram for LCR~~

17. 11 m. parcels of land in ag. use – GW, Transformig. p. 4
Cf. 2m farms!
Def. of "parcel"?
9 m parcels are nonfarm, p. 5

18. 1.26. ac. of pvt. rural land.
20 m parcels – p. 8. Cf. 11m., p. 4.
The extra 9 m are resid. + recr. 60% are > 5 ac.

19. Maybe easier to observe concn. via xfrs.
{% of xfrs, are > 100 ac. + acct. for 67% of non-ag. rural land xfrd.

20. 5.2% of the 20 m. parcels turned in 1988.
(Cf. < 2% of the ag. parcels – or is it ag. acreage? p. 6)

21. Ratios of pop / l.v.
Hammer. Land Effic. + Land Capac. l.a.

22. It is not that ~~urban~~ conc. ~~changes~~ will occur. ~~Farm~~ Urban accum.

23. Use B.C. data!

24. Use Soviet paper – reformat for U.S. Advantages of land tenure subject to "dynamic tension".

25. 1990 gg. real prop. value = $685 b
+ 896., cap. value of prop. taken at. $5.23 b. GW p.1

$\frac{5.23}{685} = .00764 = .8\%$

26. 71% of value of ag. r.e. is agro-servic.
29% is from other "pressures".
(That 29% is pure L.V., spec.)

27. Much farm r.e. is tax exempt or tax prefered.

26. Prop. tax is not "off the top." ~~It com~~
a. Land portion comes from very low rent
b. No Δ w. gross sales.

27. Pvt. parties cannot buy out tax power. Is unalienable, an attribute of sovereignty.

26. ~~28~~. $\frac{\text{Rent}}{\text{Value}}$ of "U.S. dry land," 1989, = .059
- GW p. 3-4. Rent means cash rent.

1a. + ND, ratio = .083, p.6. Ite cfd. this to .059. .059/.083 = .71

$\frac{\frac{a}{.083}}{\frac{a}{.059}} \quad \frac{\frac{a}{.059}}{\frac{a}{.083}} = \frac{.083}{.059} = 1.\ldots$

~~28. Eta. research~~

29. Bureau of regress. fall.

30. Goldenw. & Tousdell

~~31. Chambers~~

32. Causes of absentee ownership
   a. Δ l.v.
   b. i. Inside ag.
      ii. Urban fringe
      iii. Mineral
   c. Low i.g.
      Tarkio
      Bottoms
   d. Neg. amenities

33. Absentees. GW, p. 1
   a. 2.95+ m. owners of land in farms.
      44% are non-ops.
      41% of area held by non-ops.
   b. 3% are corps
      15% of area held by them.
   c. Own-p units (Ow.U.s) ave. 282 acs.
      Op " (Op.U.s) ave. 462 " GW p-1
      This refutes (a). Which is right?

34. Effect of wage tax on subbing vs. labor.

35. AELOS is 1st data on ownership under Reps. Adm. except in Prosp. Era (1900).

36. Docs:
'87 Cens of Ag. Vol. 3, Related Surveys, Pt. 2,
AELOS, '88, AC87-RS-2, July '90
+ Change Sheet, 12-90.

37. Announcement for LOTS says:
"Top 5% of ag. landowners hold over half area + ¼ of the value of the ag. land."
Strong implica. is, area rank'g o' states concn.

38. 833 m.a. pvt. land rptd. in AELOS.

39. Fms. expand to achieve scale; + scale means spreading cost of large, indivisible K inputs over more land.
Are two problems w. this:
a) Large fms. are the ones expanding,
b) " " have less K/ac. already.

40. Corpns. hold 15% land area.
How much of value? 30%? If so, not negligible.

F-1

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4 April 91

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Dear Gene:

Thanks for the materials. Comments follow.

Your review of Pollack on Populism brings out the interesting insight that Milton Friedman and W.J. Bryan were sisters under the skin! Maybe that is why both were fundamentalists, (each in his own way).

In teaching public finance, I give students a list of several concepts of justice, or equity. One of them is "free market equity," i.e. justice = perfect markets. Now I can also call that Populist equity! Thanks for new insight.

Fighting Bob LaFollette may exemplify the genus. His heirs are the frustrated people who teach Industrial Organization, and look for market manipulation.

I trust you noted that Parker v. Brown is now joined by USSC ruling in Columbia, S.C., case exempting city officials from anti-trust laws.

The rough draft of "The Distr. of Ag Landownership in U.S." is rough, all right, for which I thank you, since at this stage perhaps a few quiet screams will not go entirely unheeded.

1. There is a soothing syrup quality about p. 1 that may be necessary for an A.I. Bull., which I hope will not find its way into the LOTS seminar. Objectivity, Si; palliation, No!

2. Ownership units av. 282 ac; "Census-defined" op. units ave. 462 acs. The phrasing leaves one wondering if the universes are the same. Are the ownership units also "Census-defined," and are the definitions identical?

3. I farm 2 acres of avocadoes, in a rural-zoned area. I am listed as a customer of the Gage Canal. For some reason, this never occurred to me before, but no Census taker has ever asked me about the farm or the water. I vaguely recall responding to the personal Census by mail.

When I was taking the Census of Irrigation in 1950, we cross-checked all water sellers with all water buyers, and reconciled discrepancies with some care. I wonder how good a job they did in 1989?

4. Supposing they did enumerate me according to their rules, I suspect I would be included as an owner, but too small to be a "real" operator. If so, the universes are different, and the averages cannot be compared.

5. P.2 is suffused with regression fallacy. I have importuned you before on this subject, at length, and apparently in vain. I'll try one more time. You cannot conclude that "the value ... is more evenly distributed than acreage: ..." from your data. You have to rerank by value: then see how much of the value is held by the top 4%, etc.

I implore you to raise your sensitivity to this vital matter.

6. Worse, your paragraph 4, p.2, deals with value of land and buildings, after ranking by acreage. The point of getting data on land without buildings is to work the new data, freed from the biases inherent in the old forms of data.

7. P.5, "The significant forces of concentration ... lie outside of agriculture." That topic sentence would need heavy support, and doesn't get it. It seems contradictory to your other points, e.g. that operating economies are what make farms larger, and absentee landlords own little chunks that are consolidated by operators.

8. 62% of landlords are nonfarm, btm. p.5.

a. Can you say what share of land they own, by value? By acreage?

b. Can you relate absentee ownership to prospective rise of values, as Goldenweiser and Truesdell did in their classic studies way back when? Today, surely, we can do at least as well as they did, and build on their deep insights.

c. Can we infer from all this absentee ownership, there is a lot of rent in farm income?

d. Does it make sense to suggest that increasing the absentee landownership is a desirable route to lowering concentration of farm ownership? That sounds more like a debater's ploy to muddy the waters, than a serious proposal.

9. P. 5, 44% of operators have another principal occupation. That needs a lot of intepretation before being useful info.

a. How much of the land do they operate? How lies the Lorenz curve?

b. Are they mostly owners or tenants?

c. Break down the big ones: bankers, publishers, oil

cos., etc.

10. P.5, second one. By 1900, settlement was complete? Really! Most irrigation settlement occurred after 1900.

11. P.5, second one, last para., list of diverse interests. Add water rights to the list. Calif. farmers monopolize most of our water to produce a minuscule share of our income.

I hope these comments are useful, if acerbic. Better now than later!

Sincerely,

United States Department of Agriculture
Economic Research Service
1301 New York Avenue NW
Washington, D.C.
20005-4788

April 15, 1991

Mason Gaffney
POB 7998
Riverside, CA 92513-7998

Dear Mase:

I'll not respond here to all of your helpful comments on the Ag Information Bulletin developed from the AELOS tables. However, I will address them carefully as the manuscript works its way through the editing downstairs.

Because I value your comments highly, I will respond some of your questions/objections/suggestions that bear particularly on the AELOS survey generally. Manuscript-specific suggestions will be addressed later. Your reference to "quiet screams" has an odor of right-to-life which will go unheeded. I try mightily not to confuse rights with responsibilities, privileges with obligations, honors with guilt.

1. "soothing quality" = Facts, sir, just the facts.

2. "units" = There are more owners than operators, and the owner units are smaller than the operator units. Yes, the cost-cognizant method of getting ownership via the Census of Agriculture operating units is a nuisance. We simply do not have the resources to do a parcel based Census of Land (which I have recommended). On the other hand, the AELOS method does provide a linkage to the Census farms--an advantage?

3. "avocadoes" = If you make $1000 of cold cash from farming, you should be reporting. Write to Census of Agriculture, Iverson Mall, Suitland MD 20233.

4. My appendix and the larger appendix of the Census report I sent you explains that operation is the source of names for farms and farmland owners, common sources, differing but overlapping universes.

5. I am sensitive to the fact that the size classes available in the AELOS report, I am sure you noticed, are by acreages only. I agree that a ranking by value would be a useful classification. If the acreages are "indexed" by value and the Gini declines, it is appropriate to say that the value is more evenly distributed than acres. You are correct, of course, in saying that it would be better to have separate acreage and value rankings.

But here we are at the point of the AIB: to present some of the key data available in the printed report. Most of what you ask for is available by working with the original data set--which can be done only at Census by Census

employees or associates. We are doing that also, first, for some special runs on women owners, later, for other analyses.

6. Same as 5. Pat Canning is doing some additional work on the separation of land and building values, from our market surveys and also with the AELOS data. Our new real property tax survey is adding a question on land and buildings on tax parcels. We will see what can be done with AELOS.

7. Criticize "concentration" via the economic environment for being tautological, but not unsupportable. The real concentration is that 2-4% of the population holds nearly two thirds of U.S. acreage (agr). Concentration agr vs nonagr is much greater than within agr. Cheez!

8...11. On the specifics of tenure, I will try to take your suggestions into account--in an evenhanded, objective manner, of course.

The AIB on landlord/tenant has just been completed by Denise Rogers and is under internal review. We hope to have two more soothing AIBS on real property taxes, and land transfers completed by the fall meeting.

Thanks again for your comments. Best Wishes.

Gene

Economic Issues in Global Climate Change

Agriculture, Forestry, and Natural Resources

edited by John M. Reilly and Margot Anderson

The prospect of global climate change raises questions about many serious problems, the most important of which may be economic in nature. This volume identifies the critical economic research issues related to global climate change and focuses on the economic and policy implications for forestry, agriculture, and natural resources. Internationally known economists, scientists, and policy analysts determine the biological sources of the emissions most responsible for climate change and the cost of controlling them, quantify the effects of climate change, and analyze the economic impact of climate change on agriculture and forestry.

Contributors: Margot Anderson, John M. Reilly, Daniel L. Albritton, Richard B. Stewart, Richard B. Norgaard, Richard B. Howarth, Jae Edmonds, John M. Callaway, Dave Barns, Harry M. Kaiser, Susan J. Riha, David G. Rossiter, Daniel S. Wilks, Sally M. Kane, James Tobey, Jan Lewandrowski, Richard Brazee, Noel R. Gollehon, Michael R. Moore, Marcel Aillery, Mark Kramer, Glenn Schaible, William E. Easterling, Pierre R. Crosson, Norman J. Rosenberg, Mary S. McKenney, Kenneth D. Frederick, Gary W. Yohe, Thomas Drennen, Duane Chapman, Michael A. Fosberg, Linda A. Joyce, Richard A. Birdsey, Michael D. Bowes, Roger A. Sedjo, Richard M. Adams, Ching-Cheng Chang, Bruce A. McCarl, Kenneth R. Richards, David Godden, Philip D. Adams, Diana M. Liverman, Gennady V. Menzhulin, Ryohei Kada, Timothy Mount, Steven T. Sonka, W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Antle, Michel Potier, Tom Jones.

John M. Reilly is deputy director for technology of the Resources and Technology Division of the Economic Research Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. **Margot Anderson** is leader of the Global Resource Policy Section of the Economic Research Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Feb. 1992; 460 pages (maps, tables, figures, references, index);
0-8133-8435-4, $57.50, £38.50, sc;
Rights: world

The Changing Size and Structure of America's Farms

edited by Arne Hallam

Agriculture in the United States has changed dramatically in the twentieth century. Technological advances in the early 1900s had their biggest impact on the structure of the American farm during 1950–1970, when the number of people on farms plummeted and farm size expanded. Significant changes in the biological and technical base of agriculture over the last forty years may be just starting to have their own impact on farm structure.

The outgrowth of a five-year project analyzing these issues, this book presents the latest findings concerning past changes in structure, the factors that lead to structural change, the effects of these changes on societal welfare, and what will happen to the structure of agriculture in the years ahead. The contributors provide fresh insight on issues such as the family farm, the industrialization of agriculture, the changing power of agribusiness, the impact of agricultural technology on the environment, tenancy and land ownership, financial capital in agriculture, the relationship between agriculture and the health of rural communities, the difficulties in collecting accurate data on farm structure, the way new technologies may dramatically change the way our food is produced, and the way government changes the structure of agriculture, often in ways surprising even to itself.

Contributors: Arne Hallam, B. F. Stanton, Wayne D. Rassmussen, Robert H. Hornbaker, Steven R. Denault, Mary Ahearn, Gerald Whittaker, Hisham El-Osta, Glenn Fox, Philip Bergen, Ed Dickson, George L. Casler, James D. Johnson, Marvin T. Batte, Roger Johnson, Luther Tweeten, Joseph A. Atwood, Vincent H. Smith, Myles J. Watts, Glen A. Helmers, Boris Bravo-Ureta, Cole R. Gustafson, Peter J. Barry, Michael A. Hudson, Bruce J. Sherrick, Michael A. Mazzocco, Lindon J. Robison, Larry Janssen, Ron Stover, Virginia Clark, Thomas A. Carlin, William E. Saupe, Jay Dee Atwood, and Kent D. Olson.

Arne Hallam is associate professor of economics at Iowa State University.

Sept. 1993; ca. 630 pages;
0-8133-8606-3, $65.00, £46.50, sc;
Rights: world

Aquaculture

Models and Economics

edited by Upton Hatch and Henry Kinnucan

Presenting state-of-the-art research on the economics of producing and marketing aquacultural products, this volume addresses critical issues concerning profitability, market acceptance, and economic modeling of various aquacultural products. Research approaches range from firm-level bioeconomic modeling to market-level econometric modeling of industry growth and product substitution. The studies highlight the institutional structures and public policy issues that will shape growth and development of aquaculture into the twenty-first century, including trade policies, food safety, and environmental quality.

Contents: Introduction—**Upton Hatch and Henry Kinnucan. FARM-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION MODELS.** An Economic Policy Model for Net-Pen Salmon Farming—**Gilbert Sylvia and James L. Anderson.** Bioeconomic Modelling of Shrimp and Prawn: A Methodological Comparison—**PingSun Leung, Donna J. Lee, and Eithan Hochman.** Development and Implementation of a Fish-Farm Bioeconomic Model—**Oscar J. Cacho. FARM-MANAGEMENT APPLICATIONS.** Economics of Single- and Multiple-Batch Production Regimes for Catfish—**Carol R. Engel and Gayle Pounds.** Economics of Vertical Integration in Hybrid Striped Bass Aquaculture—**Conrado Gempesaw II, Ferdinand F. Wirth, James Richard Bacon, and Levsiri Munasinghe.** A Replacement Model for Rainbow Trout Broodstock Under Photoperiod Control—**Samuel H. Logan and Warren E. Johnston. ECONOMETRIC INDUSTRY MODELS.** Effects of Shrimp Aquaculture on the U.S. Market: An Econometric Analysis—**Walter R. Keithly, Jr., Kenneth J. Roberts, and John M. Ward.** A Dynamic Monthly Econometric Model of the U.S. Catfish Industry—**Walt Zidack, H. Kinnucan, and U. Hatch.** An International Econometric Model for Wild and Pen-Reared Salmon—**Mark Hermann, Ron C. Mittelhammer, and Biing-Hwan Lin. MARKETING APPLICATIONS.** Profile of the North American Fresh and Frozen Salmon Markets—**David Egan.** Seasonal Demand Characteristics of U.S. Farm Raised Catfish—**Johannes A.D. Lambregts, Oral Capps, Jr., and Wade L. Griffin.** The Northeast U.S. Market for Blue Mussels: Consumer Perceptions of Seafood Safety and Implications for Aquaculture—**Priscilla M. Brooks.** Conclusion: Economic Potential of U.S. Aquaculture and Emerging Research Issues—**H. Kinnucan and U. Hatch.**

Upton Hatch and **Henry Kinnucan** are associate professors in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at Auburn University.

June 1993; 286 pages
(tables, figures, index);
0-8133-8534-2, $45.00, £30.00, sc;
Rights: world

Land and Soil Management

Technology, Economics, and Institutions

Alfredo Sfeir-Younis and Andrew L. Dragun

This book outlines the physical and economic dimensions of soil erosion and estimates the overall magnitude of the problem in developing countries. It explains how to improve the evaluation of soil conservation programs by integrating scientific knowledge with economic methods and procedures. Finally, the book suggests productive areas for future research.

Contents: Introduction. Nature of the Erosion Problem. Soil Erosion Effects: A Typology. Extent of Soil rosion in Developing Countries. Extent of Downstream Damages. The Economic Nature of Soils. Integrating Alternative Frameworks. Technical Frameworks and Relationships: Erosion. Technical Frameworks and Relationships: Downstream Effects. Theoretical Economic Considerations. Illustrations. Project Appraisal Issues. Organizational and Institutional ssues. Macroeconomic Policy Issues. Compensation Issues. Discounting and Intergenerational Equity. Strategy and Research Needs.

Alfredo Sfeir-Younis is chief economist with the Economics and Policy Division of the World Bank. **Andrew K. Dragun** is senior lecturer at La Trobe University, Australia.

Aug. 1993; ca. 320 pages;
0-8133-8733-7, $67.50, £48.50, hc;
Rights: w/ind

Agricultural Cooperatives in Transition

edited by Csaba Csaki and Yoav Kislev

This volume blends theory, econometric analysis, and lessons from the cooperative experience. The chapters explore many dimensions of agricultural cooperation: service, production, and credit cooperatives; pricing, efficiency, and competitive position cooperatives in market-oriented versus centrally planned economies; and reforms and crises.

Contributors: Csaba Csaki, Zvi Lerman, Pinhas Zusman, Richard J. Sexton, Julie Iskow, Steven T. Buccola, Grete S. Stokstad, Michael Keren, David Levhari, Joan R. Fulton, Robert P. King, Günter Schmitt, Yaffa Machnes, Adi Schnytzer, Michael R. Carter, Jolyne Melmed-Sanjak, Karen A. Luz, Justin Yifu Lin, Claudia Parliament, Anacleti K. Kashuliza, Leginard N. Ngailo, Yoav Kislev, David Epshtein, Katalin Sebestyén, Edith Depetris de Guiguet, Gerald Campbell, Donald L. Hinman, Donald J. Ricks, Mahmoud El-Jafari, Raanan Weitz, Yaacov Oved, Smadar Ottolenghi.

Csaba Csaki is currently president of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, professor of agricultural economics at the Budapest University of Economics, and senior agricultural adviser at the World Bank. **Yoav Kislev** is professor of agricultural economics in the Lev Eshkol School of Agriculture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

May 1993; 432 pages
(tables, figures, notes, index);
0-8133-8759-0, $62.50, £44.95, sc;
Rights: world

Land Ownership and Taxation in American Agriculture

edited by Gene Wunderlich

How does land ownership uphold or conflict with the social contract in terms of socially created institutions, social interests and claims, income distribution, and authority versus responsibility? Contributors to this volume explore interrelationships of land ownership and tenure, land use decisionmaking, and taxation, drawing on legal and economic theory concerning value, social interest, policy considerations, and information needs.

Contributors: Emery N. Castle, Gene Wunderlich, Denise M. Rogers, J. Peter DeBraal, John Blackledge, Joan M. Youngman, A. Allan Schmid, Robert G. Chambers, Hyunok Lee, John Quiggin, Paul W. Barkley, Patrick N. Canning, Mason Gaffney, J. Fred Giertz, Leonard Shabman, James Hite, Alan Harrison, Ronald J. Oakerson, John O. Behrens, Gerard T. Keffer, Ralph E. Heimlich, Paul E. Smith, John P. Michos.

Gene Wunderlich is a senior economist with the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Nov. 1992; 277 pages (tables, figures, notes, appendix, biblio, index);
0-8133-8646-2, $49.50, £33.00, sc;
Rights: world

North-South Grain Markets and Trade Policies

edited by David Blandford, Colin A. Carter, and Roley Piggott

This valuable collection of case studies explores the domestic policies of selected countries that relate to the most basic of agricultural commodities—grains. Contributors discuss the approaches governments take in managing their domestic grain markets, evaluate the choices of alternative policies facing governments, offer insight into the effective implementation of policy choices, and draw clear and practical observations about the conditions necessary to ensure a healthy and dynamic domestic grain market.

David Blandford is head of the Trade Analysis Division, Directorate for Food Agricultural and Fisheries at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris. **Colin A. Carter** is professor of agricultural economics at the University of California–Davis. **Roley Piggott** is senior lecturer in agricultural economics and business management at the University of New England, Australia.

Feb. 1993; 391 pages
(tables, figures, notes, biblio);
0-8133-8642-X, $49.50, £33.00, sc;
Rights: world

Competitive Strategy Analysis in the Food System

edited by Ronald W. Cotterill

Comprehending the economic performance of large food firms is critical to assessing the overall performance of the food sector. Using competitive strategy analysis, contributors to this volume examine competition in the food market and recent events in the food manufacturing industry—such as the trend toward seller concentration in food manufacturing industries and retail food markets—that have accelerated food firm profitability.

Ronald W. Cotterill is professor of agricultural and resource economics and director of the Food Marketing Policy Center at the University of Connecticut.

Nov. 1992; 392 pages
(tables, figures, notes, biblio);
0-8133-8638-1, $59.95, £42.95, hc;
Rights: world

Competitiveness in International Food Markets

edited by Maury E. Bredahl, Philip Abbot, and Michael R. Reed

With negotiations over free trade areas, the completion of the European Community's Internal Market, the successful GATT negotiations on agriculture, and the ongoing discussions over the North American Free Trade Agreement, food and agricultural sectors are necessarily becoming internationally competitive. As a result, firms, farm organizations, and governments are seeking to identify sector strategies and public policies that will increase their effectiveness in international markets.

In this timely study, experts from North America, Europe, and Oceania define and evaluate the underlying concepts of firm, sector, and national competitiveness and examine the usefulness of competitiveness for setting research agendas and for guiding government policy formulation. This book offers essential reading for agricultural economists, policymakers, and scholars of international trade and economy.

Tentative Contents: Introduction—**Philip Abbott and Maury E. Bredahl. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS FROM BUSINESS STRATEGIES.** A Conceptual Framework for Assessing the Role of Private Strategy and Public Policy—**Erna van Duren, Larry Martin, and Randall Westgren.** Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Non-Price Factors: Implications for Competitiveness in International Trade—**Thomas R. Pierson and John W. Allen.** Assessing the Importance of Non-Price Factors to Competitiveness in International Food Trade—**Michael R. Reed. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS FROM TRADE AND MACROECONOMIC THEORY.** Conceptual Foundations from Trade, Multinational Firm, and Foreign Direct Investment Theory—**Wilfred J. Ethier.** Implications of the New International Economics for Conceptual Foundations—**Steve McCorriston and Ian Sheldon.** Technical Progress, Captial Formation, and Growth of Productivity—**Lawrence J. Lau.** Assessing the Role of Competitive Pressure on Productivity Growth and Competitiveness—**Nicholas G. Kalaitzandonakes, Brad Gerhke, and M. Bredahl. ASSESSMENTS OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF NATIONAL FOOD SECTORS.** Assessing the International Competitiveness of the United States Food Sector—**Stephen MacDonald and John E. Lee, Jr.** Assessing the Role of Foreign Direct Investment in Food Manufacturing Industries—**Charles R. Handy and Dennis R. Henderson.** Assessing the International Competitiveness of the Canadian Food Sector—**William M. Miner.** Market Mass Competitiveness in Canadian Food Industries—**Tim Hazeledine.** Assessing the Role of Competitiveness in Shaping Policy Choices: A Canadian Perspective—**Kenneth Ash and Lars Brink.** Assessing the International Competitiveness of the New Zealand Food Sector—**Ralph G. Lattimore.** Assessing the International Competitiveness of the Danish Food Sector—**Aage Walter Jorgensen. COMMENTARY AND IMPLICATIONS.** Commentary on the Concept of Competitiveness—**T. Kelley White.** Research Implications—**J. Bruce Bullock.** What Have We Learned About Competitiveness in International Food Markets?—**Alex F. McCalla.**

Maury E. Bredahl is professor of agricultural economics at the University of Missouri–Columbia. **Philip Abbot** is professor of agricultural economics at Purdue University, and **Michael R. Reed** is professor of agricultural economics at the University of Kentucky.

Aug. 1993; ca. 350 pages;
0-8133-1736-3, $45.00, £32.50, sc;
Rights: world

World Food in the 1990s

Production, Trade, and Aid

edited by Lehman B. Fletcher

In this important and timely volume experts from various scholarly backgrounds carefully and objectively interpret past trends in world food trade, aid, and security and propose new policy options for the 1990s. They address problems facing the distribution of global economic growth and trade between industrialized and developing countries while exploring the effects that supply, demand, foreign development assistance programs, food aid, and other policy variables have on the evolving world trade and food system.

Contributors: Lehman B. Fletcher, Lawrence R. Klein, Bruna Angel, S. R. Johnson, R. C. Duncan, Robert L. Paarlberg, Alex F. McCalla, Anne O. Krueger, Maurice Schiff, Alberto Valdacutees, Terry L. Roe, Vernon W. Ruttan, Gerald Trant, Khalid Riaz, Raymond F. Hopkins.

Lehman B. Fletcher is professor of economics at Iowa State University–Ames.

Apr. 1992; 368 pages (tables, figures, notes, biblio, appendixes);
0-8133-8049-9, $44.00, £29.95, sc;
Rights: world

Managing Food Security in Unregulated Markets

edited by Robert D. Reinsel

This important study addresses the possibilities for government intervention in primarily unregulated grain markets. It examines the forces that help create government objectives for providing income and price stability and the appropriate responses to these forces by governments whose policy objectives are market oriented. Among the issues discussed are food security, production variability, demand growth, supply response, residual suppliers and buyers, buffering mechanisms, acquisition and dispersal rules for buffers, and cereal market strategies to deal with variability.

Contents: International Stocks Management in Unregulated Markets—**Robert D. Reinsel.** Cereal Stocks and Production Variability in a Liberalized World Trade Environment—**Alexander H. Sarris.** Implications of Grain Trade Liberalization for LDC Food Security—**Peter Hazell.** Australia's Experience with Its Wool Buffer Stock Scheme—**H. Don B.H. Gunasekera and Brian S. Fisher.** Canadian Experience with, and Reliance on, Income Security and Stabilization Measures—**D. McClatchy, B. Gilmour, J. Gellner, and B. Huff.** Stabilizing Imported Food Prices for Small Developing Countries: Any Role for Commodity Futures?—**Takamas Akiyama and Pravin K. Trivedi.** Government Grain Storage: Food Security and Price Stability—**R. D. Reinsel.**

Robert D. Reinsel is senior economist at the Agriculture and Trade Analysis Division of the Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture.

Dec. 1992; 115 pages
(tables, figures, notes, biblio);
0-8133-1704-5, $32.00, £21.50, sc;
Rights: world

The World Grain Trade

Grain Marketing, Institutions, and Policies

edited by Michael J. McGarry and Andrew Schmitz

International trade outcomes are a matter of record, but for most nations little is known about the institutional and policy frameworks that shape performance in the international marketplace. This comparative study of Argentina, Brazil, Australia, Canada, and the United States analyzes the institutions and policies supporting the international grain trade with emphasis upon macro policy, marketing, the role of the public sector, and the legal and regulatory contexts.

Contributors: Julian M. Alston, Colin Carter, Brian Fisher, W. H. Furtan, Thomas C. Glaessner, Lowell D. Hill, Richard L.J. Lacroix, Michael J. McGarry, Matthew A. McMahon, Roley Piggott, Joseph C. Reid, Andrew Schmitz.

Michael J. McGarry is division chief, Agriculture Division, the World Bank. **Andrew Schmitz** is Robinson Chair Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California–Berkeley.

Feb. 1992; 511 pages
(maps, tables, figures, notes, biblio);
0-8133-8336-6, $69.95, hc;
Rights: w/uk-eur

Japanese and American Agriculture

Tradition and Progress in Conflict

edited by Luther Tweeten, Cynthia L. Dishon, Wen S. Chern, Naraomi Imamura, and Masaru Morishima

This book reveals that the tensions surrounding U.S. and Japanese agricultural trade lie less between the two nations than in an internal clash between traditional systems and economic growth. Contributors propose a policy compromise that respects Japan's concern for rice security and traditional foodstyles and America's concern for access to markets abroad—a proposal that would break a trade impasse detrimental to both Japan and the United States.

Contributors: Luther Tweeten, Junko Goto, Naraomi Imamura, Ryohei Kada, Nobuhiro Tsuboi, Tokumi Odagiri, Arne Hallam, Selahattin Dibooglu, Bernard F. Stanton, Masaru Morishima, Yoshihisa Aita, Mitsuhiro Nakagawa, Natsuki Fujita, Benjamin Senauer, Elaine Asp, Jean Kinsey, Dorothy Z. Price, Stephen J. Hiemstra, Vicki A. McCracken, Michio Kanai, Yutaka Sawada, Manabu Sawada, Rueben C. Buse, David Eastwood, Thomas I. Wahl, Wen S. Chern, Kuo S. Huang, Hwang-Jaw Lee, Yuko Arayama, Richard E. Just, Susumu Yamaji, Shoichi Ito, Kenji Ozawa, Eric J. Wailes, Kenneth B. Young, Gail L. Cramer, Keiji Oga, Dermot J. Hayes, Roland R. Robinson, John A. Naegele, Paul L. Farris, Tim Mount.

Luther Tweeten is Anderson Professor of Agricultural Marketing, Policy, and Trade in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at The Ohio State University, where **Cynthia L. Dishon** is research assistant for Anderson Professor, and **Wen S. Chern** is professor of agricultural economics. **Naraomi Imamura** and **Masaru Morishima** are professors of agricultural economics at the University of Tokyo.

Dec. 1992; 453 pages
(tables, figures, biblio);
0-8133-8700-0, $64.00, £42.95, sc;
Rights: world

Agriculture and Trade in the Pacific

Toward the Twenty-First Century

edited by William T. Coyle, Dermot Hayes, and Hiroshi Yamauchi

This is a comprehensive, up-to-date, and forward-looking volume on the economic and political forces shaping agriculture and trade in the Pacific region. In this book, leading scholars provide new information about policy reform in Japan, the meaning of economic deregulation for New Zealand agriculture and trade, the potential role of the Soviet Union and China in the Pacific, and the prospects for agriculture in the Southeast Asian nations.

Contributors: William T. Coyle, Lawrence R. Klein, Kym Anderson, John W. Mellor, Yutaka Yoshioka, Fumio Egaitsu, Alan J. Webb, Allan Rae, Liborio Cabanilla, Tan Siew Hoey, Faisal Kasryno, Suthad Setboonsarng, Ammar Siamwalla, Direk Patamasiriwat, Francis C. Tuan, Shi Ru, Sergei B. Iliukhin, Kenneth Gray, Ron A. Sandrey, David Harris, Ian Shaw, Julian M. Alston, Colin A. Carter, Marilyn D. Whitney, Thomas Wahl, Dermot Hayes, Andrew Schmitz, Hiroshi Yamauchi.

William T. Coyle is chief of the Developed Market Economies Branch of the United States Department of Agriculture. **Dermot Hayes** is assistant professor of agricultural economics at Iowa State University. **Hiroshi Yamauchi** is professor of agricultural economics at the University of Hawaii.

Apr. 1992; 344 pages
(tables, figures, notes, biblio, index);
0-8133-8277-7, $55.00, hc;
Rights: w/brit

Costs and Returns for Agricultural Commodities

Advances in Concepts and Measurement

edited by Mary C. Ahearn and Utpal Vasavada

Policymakers, farmers, the managers of agribusiness, and others look to agricultural economists for accurate estimates of the costs and returns of individual agricultural commodities. But there is great diversity of opinion and disagreement about the best method for such analysis among practitioners. The contributors to this volume work at the cutting edge of estimation scholarship, and here they explore how different uses of estimates determine different methods of estimation, as well as evaluate the preferred methods for similar uses.

Contributors: John E. Lee, Jr., B. H. Robinson, Gayle S. Willett, Glenn A. Helmers, Myles J. Watts, David H. Harrington, Vernon R. Eidman, Robert H. Hornbaker, Steven T. Sonka, Bruce L. Dixon, Carol C. House, Odell L. Walker, Eldon Ball, Richard A. Schoney, Mitchell Morehart, James D. Johnson, Hosein Shapouri, Leo J. Guedry, Karen Klonsky, DeeVon Bailey, John E. Ikerd, B. F. Stanton, Otto Doering, Patrick Westhoff, Lindon J. Robison, Steven R. Koenig, Charles H. Barnard, Michael Salassi, Allen M. Featherstone, Michael Duffy, Oscar R. Burt, Cole R. Gustafson, Peter J. Barry, Mir B. Ali, Utpal Vasavada, Gregory M. Perry, Daniel A. Sumner, Wallace E. Huffman, Carlyle Ross, M. C. Hallberg, Thomas A. Miller, Arne Hallam, R. J. Hildreth, Lawrence A. Lippke, Jerry Crews, James C. Wade.

Mary C. Ahearn is a section leader in the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture. Previously, she was responsible for the production of the department's cost of production estimates. **Utpal Vasavada** is visiting associate professor of agricultural economics at Texas A&M University.

Feb. 1992; 395 pages
(tables, figures, references, appendix);
0-8133-0369-9, $47.00, £31.50, sc;
Rights: world