

Syn. City. Materials & Fragments

Crowding lot lines

1. Is kind of ~~sapping~~ first & easiest perceived [by ave. person who is borderline-apathetic until struck by something dramatic & graphic at an individ. level not requiring system anal.]

Exagg. by
Leads to zoning for low
density, major
obstacle to eqn.

Perceptual bias. One sees ^{contiguous} proximate damage, not sees not system gains.
Class bias - one sees poor offhand rich. but not how those massive flies into poor; or trees block views.
Is the kind most legislated vs. by zoning.

Far SM below than required, b/c zoning subverted. Much exercised.

3. Zoning is a good control. ^{cd. may be helpful as part of solution.} - precludes, defensive buying, ~~the~~ some, & As density. (also, sequegs. noxious uses)

2. Zoning not ~~main~~ ^{much} ~~source~~ of problem is temp., & successional - higher density ~~problems~~ interferes w. present use, not future use -- ~~so~~ more likely complements future use. ^{invasion of higher density.} ^{city green} compactly, de minimis. at best, is good can help synch. compact succession. Or, that makes the ~~real~~ ^{aggregated} problem, const. mixing of ~~infill & upgrade old higher.~~ in compat. uses, so the 'temporary' becomes a permanent anxiety, w/o redeeming grace. / As to hurting future (over)

4. ~~Source is preemptive.~~

✓ Zoning in practice worsens this. ^{many uses in areas are kept low-density.} Much leapfrog bldg. is preemptive,

- to get grandfather clause. Solution: noxious is noxious, regardless
- to get Δ by breaking zoning

Fiscal ^{exclusionary} ~~preemptive~~ zoning motive, takes over -- treated later.

Subverted.

use, unlikely, bcs. vulnerability is mutual - 1st & 2nd building
has lost more, e.g. cd. black windows w. blank wall.

Crowding lines

Crowding saps neighbor's value, by interfering w. his present, also future use.
~~Going ed. be const. - 2 A density by precluding defensive buying.~~
~~Has been permitted to reduce use. This must be exercised.~~
Is a problem of differential density, in part. Leapfrogging.

Solutions - a) More high-rise, or just 2-3 stories. Energy comes there, too.

Some is ~~temp.~~ hinders present & not future use. Harkens evolution. Good if constant; bad when leapfrogging.

Some is preemptive. hinders future not present use. E.g. a hi-rise to lot line - but far-fetched, vulnerability is mutual.

Some uses are more compatible than others;

some uses " " conflicting " " - e.g. machine-generators go together, but annoy residents.

When annoyance is mutual, uses will avoid ea. other.

" " " unilateral, protest-needed --- but this goes way beyond crowding lot lines.

✓ (Vehicle traffic is much more damaging than a wall, near my house, but zoning fixes on the wall)

The best specialities go to central units, to be most accessible.

All things rare & valuable, and best of their kind.

Distribution of all products & services is cheaper

"The power of sympathy, the sense of companionship, the emulation of companions & contrast, open a wider, and fuller, and more varied life." In joy & sorrow there are more to share.

In city, repairman close by.
Can get quick repair.

This saves K.

- Keep old carcass alive longer
- Less need to put in more initial K to prevent breakdowns.
- Less need for spares & duplicates on hand, on standby.

Copy for Conf. Talk.

Mason Gaffney

Outline. Paper for de Neufville conference on cities

I. The urban promise and the land market. The city that might have been -- and might yet be.

A. Classical rationale for the land market as sorter and arranger of land uses -- a reminder of some old truths. *Von Thunen: Ely: Weberman: Ratchiff.* Rationale for highest and best use as defined in dollars, in terms of efficiency. Propensity of anti-market forces to substitute other value measures and systems without adequate rationale: (agricultural fundamentalism, highway imperialism, elitism, naturalism, *energy balance,* *material balance,* *balance of payments,* needs and "requirements", partial vs. system overviews re open space, distributive equity via payments in kind, etc.)

B. Centripetal force, the density gradient, and economy of "street capital". How economy of private land works toward economy of public improvements and utility lines. Coordination and synchronization of public and private investments. *1 door for the mold.*

A glaring gap in the classical rationale: the propensity to rationalize speculation and underutilization of land. The difference between a gut conservative and an economist. Speculation to be treated as a market failure, in the main. *Some speculative holding is socially rational. Public vs private "reservation"*

C. Urban nuclei and the urban promise. Economies of scale of central places, broken down into elements.

(B) deals only w. min. costs. (C) means output/cap. As w. size - Alonso.

1. Maximum access to the basic foundations that located the city, such as a harbor, railhead, scenic and climatic advantage-amenity, focus of highways and streets, confluence, river crossing, political capitol, water supply, religious feature, military base and so on. Good circulation focuses demand on these features and aids their further development: more frequent freight service, better harbor facilities,

better roads, new transportation forms, etc. Markets and storage facilities develop with good access to the hub, and develop synergistic relations with each other, leading to manufacturing, innovation, trading, and tertiary services. Some locating features, like amenities and religion, may fail to benefit, although there is a significant replacement of natural amenities by man-made ones which, except in certain dark moods, has to be considered a plus by many people.

2. Maximum access of urban dwellers and visitors to each other, for social and commercial, educational and cultural, and other reasons. *a-16. Clustering is self-reinforcing, access is mutual, seekers seek more seekers.*

3. Sharing common costs:

- a. Of developing basic locating factors
- b. Of local consumption facilities (auditoria, stores, schools, mass transit, water and sewer, etc.) *a 12*
- c. Of export services and industries

4. Allowing higher specialization: of people, land, buildings, equipment, and wares. This applies to small things as well as large. Special interest services and products that serve a small percentage of the population find adequate markets only where there is access to many people. Processing that calls for a variety of small inputs gathered in one market may now occur.

*Byproducts; recycling
Pooling force.*

5. Increasing competition. *Whittier* The large market *Conditions of workable compen.*
many sellers & buyers
not only supports larger and more diverse facilities, but

*financing
into
marginal
costs.*

more of each. These compete with each other and spare consumers from monopolistic exploitation in ^{many} all its forms, including sluggishness. Competitors may also differentiate their services, adding to choice and variety and innovation and improvement.

Smaller firms are found in larger cities, because larger cities provide them with infrastructure and support. It is easier to enter business with a small capital, and less devastating to terminate a business. Entry and exit are the life of competition.

Draw on larger labor pool, & compare among workers.

6. Maximizing options. A large market brings more services and facilities over the threshold of economic viability. This ~~sharpens competition~~ gives substance to the abstract "freedom of choice." ^{Variety} In social life, too, one may choose friends based on common interests rather than propinquity alone.

allow discovery - i.e., create env. for learning what is available. Window shopping (over)
There are also more options for disposal of products.

By-products may be used, and put to higher uses, where there are many buyers.

Salvage and recycling of old parts and materials is feasible, and recycling industries develop. The cost of collection is a primary obstacle to salvage and recycling, but urban density and centralization ^{can operate to lower} ~~minimize~~ collection costs. *[UPS says its costs are highest in the desert areas]*

This benefit, like the others, results from the operation of the land market in conjunction with the public circulation system, as the market locates activities for maximum synergism and mutual aid.

allowing promoting
7. Maximum flexibility and adaptability to recombine inputs

in the face of shifting demands and costs. Subcontracting facilitated. *infrastructure backup*
Lower penalty on starting & stopping - faster turnover, replant. Embodiment of latest techniques.

learning about new alternatives -- a place to be educated, keep with it, - for
profit, edu., & excitement & enjoyment.

City as a big apple is a collective public good. ~~It~~ Like a library.
It is ^{also} the place to locate public goods like libraries, max. their value.

Excess and diversified capacity in infrastructure and storage of wares accommodates variations in supply and demand. Ditto ^{and capital} for labor pool. These afford slack needed for change, emergencies, and innovation.

8. Pool and diversify risks. Increase load factors on limiting capital items by smoothing aggregate loads, just as the flow of rivers varies much less at their mouths than their headwaters. Minimize unemployment of labor by affording variety of work. This is especially important where more than one family member are specialists, and both require appropriate work within commuting range of one residence. Store wares at point of maximum access, pooling variations in supply and demand, reducing aggregate capital requirements and/or improving service to customers, and the market for sellers.

Pooling K funds, savings & ~~loans~~ ^{borrowing}. Leads to control, center of orgn. - mixed blessing.

9. Facilitating innovation and stimulating creative activity.

Nursing fr.

These result from wide exposure to varied stimuli. In primary areas, monoculture breeds monotony; minds are not stretched by living with the routines of just one industry. Cities are exciting and varied. Information and ideas may be pooled. Innovators may dispose over a variety and volume of inputs to combine into new products.

Over-specialize a mixed blessing - may dull some kinds of resourcefulness & independence devd. in rural life.

10. Affording environment for the flowering of culture, education, research, urbane graces, entertainment, social life, cooperation, political organization, mental stimulation, etc.

11. *Mutual reflection, capturing spillovers mutually. a, b, 11, 7*

Cities exist to bring people together. The land market, when properly lubricated, allocates land so as to abet this basic urban function.

II. Killers of the dream: pitfalls and parasites on the pathway to paradise.

When organisms combine for mutual aid there is symbiosis. But it may also be one-sided and parasitic. Cities are full of parasitic effects whereby one land use preys on others. We now survey these parasitic effects, picking up clues, where we can, as to how we might overcome them, and whether this calls for replacing the market or merely amending it, *or liberating it.*

A. Pollution (physical and sociological)

Pollution includes not just ^{gross} ~~the obvious~~ smoke, shadow, noise and odor, but ~~a variety of~~ lesser nuisances that are below the threshold of effective social action against them yet whose cumulative effect is harmful.

The polluter in effect appropriates part of the property, an easement over the property of others, including the public. Mr. Coase would claim, I surmise, that people wanting peace and quiet are equally demanding easements over the property of people who want to commit nuisances, but this is wrong: they are only demanding that the nuisances be contained within the property of the polluter. Thus I would not waste much time on Coase's notion that polluters and their victims are of co-equal merit and standing and should be thought of objectively as "emitters" and "receptors". This is just a little too absurd for my patience, although there are a few exceptional cases where it might apply. Let ~~these~~ be advanced on their ^{individual} merits and not blown into a general philosophy. The market has solutions, but there is limited scope for Coase's contractual bargaining.

Pollution is not the product of more intensively used land as such,
at all, and should not be thought of that way. In other words, high intensity prescribed by the market does not cause more pollution, and open space does not prevent pollution. Here are some examples of open space with high nuisance-

generating and harboring capacities.

defunded as
Vacant fields in urban areas used to be playfields for the innocent sports of childhood. Now, children have mini-bikes without mufflers. Weeds grow uncontrolled, seeding the neighbors' lands. Sidewalks go unshoveled, *in winter.* And some day the fields are sold for tracts, so the community that relied on them ~~in~~ in lieu of parks goes without. Meantime, people who might have resided or worked there have had to resort to more remote land. At best, such land reservations do not create open space, they merely relocate it, i.e. they destroy it elsewhere. But they destroy more than they reserve, for to reach their remote residences now people must drive further, using more roads and cars, which demand enormous space.

Dumps and junkyards are open space, but not amenities. Parking lots, the aprons of drive-ins including gas stations, auto dealerships, industrial storage areas, mines, farms sprayed with lethal pesticides, cemeteries, artillery ranges, airports, railyards, freeways, ~~private exclusive golf clubs~~, private closed beaches: these are all open space, without buildings, that shed negative externalities. Yes, even cemeteries. A number of commercial streets in Milwaukee are just as dead across from the cemetery as in it, by actual market evidence. Golf courses are nice, where integrated with edging homes, but behind a chain-link fence they are no better than a big hole in the earth.

Plng. ed. center on good edge effects

~~Before pushing into the arms of government to solve~~
Reducing density, therefore, is no general solution to pollution.

✓ Lower residential density, indeed, means larger lawns, which mean power mowers and more room for unmuffled jalopies. Land use controls, therefore, are a small part only of the anti-pollution effort. They are no substitute for direct action against polluters. We are undergoing now the prolonged cultural shock of accepting this necessity, with its limitations on our license and its need to spend money and political effort to curb unreconstructable slob by force.

Government is the appropriate agency for acting against polluters; but it need not do so by rejecting the market. The most perfect tool against polluters would be an effluent charge, where that is administratively feasible. An optimal effluent charge, like many optimal government pricing policies for municipal services, is a market surrogate, an attempt to do what a good market would do if one were possible.

Direct government control of land use has not in the past brought good results. On the contrary, land owned and policed by government is the source of our worst pollution.

Grushkin's Law I refer, of course, to the highways and streets. *add military bases, TVa* Public behavior in public places is the source of major air and noise pollution.

Even parks, with the modern decline in social controls, have often become major nuisance sources. Government officials have shown themselves to be responsive to the demands of motorbikers who want to degrade BLM lands, and rock concert groups with P.A. systems who dominate some public parks. A tradition has developed that one may behave irresponsibly on public land.

Water surfaces, too, harbor noise-polluting motorboats which receive more protection from state laws than those wishing peace and quiet. - not to be the victims of noise pollution.

It is not likely, therefore, that direct allocation of land by government, or extensive controls, contain the essence of effective solutions. What is required, rather, is full realization of the enormous bias caused by the fact that the burden of action and proof fall always on the victim, rather than the polluter; and to reverse this relationship or compensate for

it institutionally. The E.I.R. requirement is a good means of compensating, for example, although it is a bare beginning and contains biases of its own, being partial rather than system-wide; and addressed to land developments rather than the job of policing individual actions on most other lands.

B. Cross-subsidy in mass systems

Most mass systems providing municipal services use consolidated accounts ^{which} to mask the fact that ~~some~~ ^{some plans} service to parts of the system makes money, and ^{to} other parts lose it. money. The winners carry the losers, thus dissipating the rents the system might earn. The general patterns ^{are 2} is that the center is milked to feed the fringes, especially if they are ragged; and high-density areas are milked to feed low-density ones. ^{Result from p.s.}

~~ATTA~~ ^{priced; current by promotional new structures} This includes the city street system. The wealthy live in outer suburbs and drive their cars past the homes of the poor on the way to work, perhaps parking in front of their homes all day. City dwellers drive around suffering congestion on streets paid for from local taxes, paying gas taxes used to build lightly-used long roads for farmers and exurbanites. Wilbur Thompson has ^{called the} given mankind the ~~happy~~ phrase, "the city as a distorted price system," ~~which sums up this sort of thing.~~

A second aspect of this, which may be as or more important, is that lower density uses make less contribution to urban synergism. In fact, since cities exist to bring people together, vacant and lightly-used land reduce synergism, especially of course if they are near the center.

The role of government in this has not been such as to inspire confidence that an increase in its powers, absent

some revolution in thinking, would help any. Private profit-making providers of mass services generally push to avoid cross-subsidy, except where regulatory bias and Averch-Johnson effect dominate. It is governments which impose a "duty to serve" which ignores cost. It is government zoning which encourages the parasitic low-density and interdicts the ~~surplus~~ rent-generating high density. Utility rate regulation guarantees a return on aggregate invested capital, without requiring that marginal investments pay for themselves, thus creating an overpowering incentive for utilities to invest ~~marginal~~ submarginally at their fringes to support their rate bases and justify higher rates at their centers. The problem is not underuse of government, but misuse of government. Where ignorant armies clash by night, nothing is gained by increased firepower.

not in case
of
Fcc
vs
AT&T.

Cross-subsidy along territorial lines is an almost inevitable consequence of legislative log-rolling, where government is in command, and where taxes are not based on benefits received. "French equity" prevails, a term derived from the traditional French approach to equity whereby every heir's ~~was to get an equal share of real estate~~ share was equalized in kind rather than by money payments. In our city councils, ~~if you~~ what you do for one ward you must do for others, and this goes clear up to Congress, of course. The solution, I believe, has to involve taxation of the unearned increment of land values. Then, government recoups its outlays, and those who get none are not injured. Cross-subsidy develops as an approach to equity among landowners once they have established a system of taxing sales and income to support real estate values.

But capturing unearned increments, does not that call for officials buying and selling land, levying special development charges, trading windfalls for wipeouts, defining development rights, expropriating and condemning and planning and controlling and intermeddling? Not really, unless one just naturally prefers that sort of thing. It may be done by levying heavy property taxes on land values and keeping assessments current. This proposal, which is very popular among economists, is compatible with a free market in land. I believe, in fact, it is necessary to ~~make~~ oil the market and make it work right. It also lets planners go ahead and favor some areas over others, developing neighborhood specialization and differentiation, such as the urban promise requires.

C. Absentee ownership

Another parasite is the absentee owner. He is more parasitic than the resident owner, as a broad generalization because his absence precludes his doing civic duties, the many unpaid services people do for each other out of public spirit, social pressure, and sociability. He is not there to tend to weeds, noisy trespassers, and shoveling walks. He does not contribute to community chests, churches, or service clubs. ^{spends income elsewhere} This ^{has less, remains slower.} has been documented in Jon Udell's study on the effects of the merger movement in Wisconsin.

Absentee owners are notably lacking in enterprise. Their buildings tend to run down and degrade their surroundings. They do not cooperate in promoting and renewing downtowns. Cite research of Jos. Monson re correlation of estate owners and derelict properties in San Francisco. CBDs as colonies.

✓ The effective medicine for absenteeism is to build fires under the derelict owners by heavy taxes on their land. The ratio of land value to buildings, and of land value to activity-based taxes on sales and income, is in general much higher for absentees than residents. In addition, the problem of estates, ^{(e} divided ownerships) needs to be addressed by legal reforms. A two-year sunset law for unsettled estates is the kind of thing to be pursued -- some legal-economic research and planning should, of course, precede legislation.

Absentee ownership is on the rise in large sections of the country. Even foreign ownership is conspicuously increasing. There would be a natural tendency for local governments to discriminate against non-voting absentees, but state laws tend to block this. Although compounded with unworthy bias and chauvinism, it is on the whole a healthy instinct that should be encouraged, since absentees are such parasites.

One important step is hewing to the one-man one-vote principle. Now, in many special service districts, it is property rather than residence that is voted. An outright residence requirement for ownership, as in the Homestead Act and the Reclamation Act of 1902, poses heavy enforcement problems. A similar end may be attained by local governments' granting homestead exemptions to full time residents.

D. Crowding the lot lines.

This is the first parasitic effect which most people think of, and indeed the only one. The result is a gross institutional bias whereby public policy is everywhere harnessed

to the one end of requiring land-consumption around buildings,
in excess of what individuals will pay for voluntarily.

There is fire beneath the smoke. A high-rise to the
lot line does encroach on the value of the neighboring lot for
use as a bungalow with garden parties and nude bathing, let us
say. Two high-rises wall-to-wall destroy each others' windows.
Growing trees, by the way, can rob a picture-window of its view
just as well as buildings, but zoning does not control trees.
Trailer parks in the midst of horse farms undoubtedly cast a
pall -- although it is the horse manure that generates flies.

Less clear is the R1-65 subdivision tract in the ^{or trailer park}
midst of one acre ~~lots~~ or larger. The tract probably downgrades
the estates, but there is ^{a limit on how much} ~~no particular reason why~~ the estates
~~should~~ upgrade the tract, since most homes in the tract are
affected primarily by each other. There would seem, therefore,
a net gain in avoiding such sharp contrasts in density. Policies
against leapfrogging are called for. In addition, the tract
might be located next to a blighted neighborhood which it would
help to upgrade. There is a clear net gain therefore in fostering
infilling, with new high-density middle-income housing located
compactly and near-in. It is my opinion that a well-oiled
market, lubricated by land taxation, and guided by a rational
economic policy anent leapfrog extension of infrastructure
would handle most of this problem much better than our current
zoning practises. We will also discuss later the need to remove
fiscal bias caused by failure to support redistributive functions
at a high level of government.

Another factor re tracts is their ticky-tackiness. Why must this be? It was not always so. Before world war II, subdivision of land and building houses were two separate functions, as a rule, meaning we got custom homes in tracts. Many attractive high-density areas in middle-aged neighborhoods remind us of this era. Then came the orphan subdivisions of 1929 et seq. The killer of the dream was the lot speculator. To overcome him, postwar builders turned to tract housing. Tract housing has evolved into the ~~nauseating~~ cookie-cutter subdivision which provokes strong feelings of nausea in all beholders, thus provoking more resistance to density than otherwise.

✓ But why, one wonders, should private landowners lay out the public streets? Here, this market-oriented philosopher sees a larger role for public planners. Strange is it not in our times that officials should intermeddle so in private affairs while neglecting public ones? Nothing could be so inherently public as street planning. Attorney John Murphy of Baltimore is campaigning currently for a return to public street planning, including initiative in subdivision. This seems to me the right way to go, and it should be made to work by synchronizing private response to public investment by laying heavy annual land taxes on improved lots.

The rationale for zoning is to prevent lot-line crowding, but of course this role has been overwhelmed by the exclusionary one, and perhaps it was always so. But if ^{we} _A could ~~overcome~~ filter out the exclusionary aspect there would be a constructive role for zoning, one which would actually increase land use density/by precluding defensive buying to protect ones' self against uncontrollable contingencies.

probably Michelman said first?

✓ A constructive zoning rule would be this: no owner may build closer to the lot line than his neighbor may if their both doing it would maximize the joint value of their two (or several) lots. Such a rule is consistent with principles of law. (cite Ellickson in Yale Law J.) If it would hold up in court it could also be administered; if it could be administered it could be understood and accepted by landowners and not even require much administration. It could of course be elaborated to include more than distance from the line. Height and f.a.r.s could be ^ecomprhended. Staggering should obviously be used extensively, and encouraged by zoning rules. An excellent exercise for geometrically minded planning students would be to stagger waterfront hillside apartments so as to maximize the aggregate service flow to residents from the view.

Subject to this rule, neighbors might exchange zoning rights, too, not as the primary control but as a supplement and a monitor on it. Such exchanges would generate information of value to zoners which might lead them to better plans.

In all these proximity questions, planners and zoners have generally had their eyes on the wrong ball, in my opinion. Indeed, it is not their eyes, but their ears they should use. ~~more.~~ Proximity is almost totally harmless if the neighbor is quiet. Instead of addressing directly the essential problem of noise pollution, we act like the Chinese in Lamb's Essay on Roast Pig. We burn down our neighbors' house in advance in order to keep his hi-fi out of our living rooms. If we focused our social controls on noise, rather than building positions, we would accomplish the desired end at a fraction of the cost. Now, we pay the cost and do not accomplish the end, as the technological

multiplier of adolescents' ability to generate offensive noise increases with the square of their distance from us.

There is no defense in depth. Empty land is no substitute for social controls.

Motorcycle, please go by.

E. Loading the social infrastructure.

Some land uses impose much higher than average loads on the streets. Anything auto-oriented is guilty: ~~auto~~ car lots, drive-ins, ^{junkyards} gas stations, suburban residences of commuters, and so on. Since use of the streets is not priced, and parking is underpriced if at all, and capital in autos ^{& trucks} is usually exempt from property taxes, and streets are partly financed from property taxes, ^{& auto pollution is not priced. Autos parked on yards; junkyards} and gas tax revenues are dissipated in Montana and Nevada deserts, the whole system conspires to make auto-oriented land uses into parasites.

of streets, a-14, Sapping K, a-15.

Esply, some kinds - Greenham's Law

The power which government has is not being used to correct, but more to create the problem. The same municipality that prohibits buildings near lot lines will let cars be strewn all over them. The police power that limits building heights lets vehicles go unmuffled with impunity. There is no pressure to make trucks smaller, but only to make roads wider.

The same municipality which extends streets to leapfrog tracts will finance its outlays by taxing high-rise buildings. Yet, one-third or so of the cost of high-rise buildings consists of the vertical utility core which provides vertical transportation at private expense. By taxing vertical transportation and subsidizing horizontal extensions, government creates an overwhelming bias in the market. The resulting *sprawl*

is thoughtlessly attributed to market forces, both by critics and supporters of the market. It is rather the product of institutional bias. The solution is not more government powers, but intelligent use of the ones government already has. The shortage is not of power, but intelligence, and this will not be remedied by an increase of power. Would to Heaven I could prescribe some way to remedy the shortage of intelligence, but there is no point in deluding ourselves that there is some solution other than in the heads of men.

Any underpriced public service invites the expansion of parastic land uses. Water supply is such an one. And what, pray, is the greatest use of cheap water? Lawn sprinkling and farming, both obviously great favorites of planners who fight market choices over land allocation.

Schools are the largest expense on the local tax structure, and probably therefore the greatest basic source of opposition to intensive residential (but not industrial and commercial) land use. From a narrow parochial view, this turns residences into parastic land uses. From a larger view, if public education is viewed as a birthright for the young, a sort of equity in the nation's property, then it is not parasitic. As this is the prevailing view we accept it here and examine its implications. These are that central government, either state or national, should pool fiscal resources at a high level in order to finance education. This, of course, is the thrust of recent court decisions and is gradually being implemented. This having been done, school children will cease to appear to local governments as parasites, but will pay their own way. This argument against intensive land use will then lose its force.

Welfare is a little more complex. It is old buildings, rather than breeding pen type homes, that harbor welfare cases. Yet we do not find in local policy the same bias against older residences that we find against breeding pens. This leads one to wonder if fiscal planning is the real source of bias against children, after all. Why do cities cling so firmly to the policy of basing property taxes on buildings? This policy virtually exempts the old buildings that harbor welfare cases and crime. The answer may lie in greater central sharing of welfare costs; plus a cultural bias in favor of grandfather clauses which let any building, once built, stand until it falls. These, plus an odd notion that preserving slums may serve in lieu of welfare programs to salve consciences toward the very poor and disabled - as well as the simply parasitic.

F. Old buildings amid new

a 10, H

Old buildings ^{often} ~~clearly~~ draw value, in parasitic

fashion, from new ones around them. Old ones, on the whole, downgrade their vicinities, while new ones do the opposite.

Old ones ^{harbor} ~~house~~ welfare cases and crime-prone families, imposing costs on the community. Old ones pose greater fire hazards, a social problem and a fire department cost. Old ones generate more vermin and public health problems. Old ones are exempt from requirements for offstreet parking which are forced on new ones, thus reserving free street parking for the old. Old ones are often exempt from assorted space and sanitary requirements imposed on newer ones. *Old-Law Tenements.*

Public policy, primarily via the property tax, clearly favours the old, so long as they remain blighted and derelict.

*Too sweeping.
Scatter diagram.*

if not maintained or rehab'd.

Defenders of the property tax on buildings have often touted it as a kind of user charge, but this becomes nonsense when we compare buildings of different age. The old ones have little value for tax base, but impose increased user costs on the community. They have negative neighborhood effects, and drain surrounding lands of their renewal value.

The mutually reinforcing decline of old neighborhoods, therefore, is not a product of the free unbiased market, but of the cultural bias that causes us to favor old buildings at the expense of new. The solution is a set of unbiased institutions that would free market forces to do their constructive work.

The "in-kind" fallacy
One important change is to stop confusing slums with the welfare system. If we want a welfare system, let us make payments in money, and not preserve unfit housing on the thought that to demolish it would deprive welfare cases.

Another needed change is the market-oriented system of taxing land values and exempting buildings. Richard Hurd as long ago as 1902 enunciated a basic principle that urban land values are marked by spatial continuity, both concentric and axial. This means that strength can build on strength. Governmental urban renewal programs, ignoring this truth, tried to renew cities by parachuting new buildings into the centers of blighted neighborhoods. Market renewal, on the other hand, anchors itself on one side to strength, thus sequentially renewing the blight from the fringes on inwards. Blighted neighborhoods (except in the van of commercial expansion) are marked by very low land values. Land values are the renewal value of land, what one pays for bare land as a building site.

Demolition and renewal occur when the land value so determined exceeds the value of the old building. As renewal proceeds inward from the fringe, a tax on land values will push slightly ahead of it, prompting renewal as it goes. It will prompt synchronized renewal block after block, with each renewed site radiating encouragement to the others. Thus an unbiased market contains the mechanism for continuous urban renewal, while many public programs to amend or replace the market have been counterproductive.

G. Holding land for future use.

Land held for future use, in a complementary urban context, is a nuisance and a parasite. It occupies space that others must traverse to perform the basic functions of cities, which exist to bring people together. It has to be bypassed by costly, capital-intensive infrastructure lines, adding to the costs of others on whom most taxes and user charges fall. It radiates on its neighbors the nuisance of uncertainty as to future use. It may be put to tacky interim uses like most drive-ins, attracting noisy smelly cars and often fostering juvenile delinquency.

The notion that every firm that might expand must hold its own reserve of land for future expansion rather presupposes the absence of a workable land market, and, in circular fashion, fulfills the prophecy by tying up lots of land. Negative feedback. Vertical intr.

It was the cardinal weakness of neo-classical rationalizers of the land market to feel they must be

Vacant is top of iceberg only. (lower)

but the land market is often unworkable - assembly problems

Floating value is floating cloud of poison gas, van of expanding CBD.
Same as effect on groves - no replant, concd. holding. But effect on
resids. is worse, whored, blight.

Blighted land blight back.

the explainers and defenders of land speculation. This came to a head with Ely's doctrine of ripening costs. Ely reinforced this with an ^{excessive} emphasis on how equally high uses might have very different intensities, thus rationalizing the parking lot in the forest of skyscrapers, and so on. Leapfrogging and sprawl, by Ely, were simply market phenomena representing how the market serves as the sorter and arranger of land uses, in the process of sifting and winnowing by which alone the highest use may be found.

a quarter-truth blown into a whole truth.

Anti-market philosophers would be delighted to have the market defenders carry such a burden, no doubt, and many gut conservatives shoulder it with a happy knee-jerk, in their faith that whatever happens in the market has to have a good reason. An economist, however, is more disposed to find market failure and institutional bias at work here. Cite Gaffney, "Tax Reform to Release Land", "Land and Rent in Welfare Economics", etc., and summarize the theses there developed.

Taxes are the answer.

A-27. Presumptive nuisance establishment.

H. Redistributive taxation

4 1 — Schooling, welfare, religious exemptions, and other redistributive requirements are mandated at the state level and, to a degree, imposed on localities. While at a high level of government these are accepted, yet at the local level they may appear to old settlers to be parasitic.

The policy of having central governments mandate expenditures for local ones leads to large biases in locational incentives. Poorer people are constantly seeking to invade local jurisdictions of higher per capita wealth, with developers

running interference.

~~blocking out the tacklers.~~ Both the blockers and the tacklers have developed high levels of skill at this game, in which the basic interests of efficiency and consumer sovereignty are getting lost in the shuffle. The ~~blockers~~ tacklers, of course, are using the government's police power as a major weapon, as they blanket the nation with exclusionary zoning. And the developers, do they represent free market forces? Hardly, because they frequent city hall more than anyone, seeking public works extensions and variances, and bankrolling councilmen. Land is allocated according to pressure and influence; decisions are made in and behind the forum, more than the marketplace.

Is there perhaps a moral here for those who feel that government regulation of land use will lead to a better world? We already have a large measure of it, and it is not a pretty picture.

Redistribution and equalizing of wealth and income, if desirable and feasible, are clearly not so at the local level because localities are open to limitless immigration. They will resist, they do resist, so long as local governments have any power. If we want to redistribute wealth, we must have central governments distribute social dividends to individuals as such, as citizens. A reasonable surrogate is payments to local governments which are in proportion to population, a.d.a., etc.

Such payments, to be meaningful and effective, should be regarded as net payments above tax burdens. It does not help to levy taxes in proportion to population, and return them in the same measure (although it would improve on current practise.) Central governments now rely in in personam taxation primarily, and

local ones on in rem taxation. To redistribute wealth, central governments would have to tax wealth, not persons. This basic principle has been masked by our infatuation with the word "income", and the apotheosis of income taxation as a panacea. Incometaxation as it actually exists taxes persons for working much more than it taxes wealth for yielding services or appreciating, and is pretty much the antithesis of a social dividend. Indeed, a most effective way to distribute social dividends would simply be to abate income taxes. a-33

J. (over) I. Sequen. [from too much choice?] a-9, 12. Alienation
K. g. Miscellaneous parasitic effects

These include harboring criminals; tending to degrade tastes and character; contributing to delinquency and anti-social behavior; etc.

III. Repairing the pathway to paradise

There are ³two sharply different reactions to the fact that the market has flaws, and there are institutional biases. One may resolve to correct the flaws and straighten the biases; or to reject the market altogether and substitute various direct controls. a 3d route is P.U.D. a-11

former route is more hopeful and constructive, route is reform govt. re Circn.; & use atomistic mkt. for priv. land.

In this section we pull together the loose ends left hanging in II, and summarize the policy recommendations foreshadowed there. Foster supporting & substituting

subt. K; weed out sapping K.

We do not conclude with a rejection of planning. On the contrary, we see an expanded role for rational public planning, and deplore the dereliction that has turned over so much of this role to private land developers.

We would, however, define carefully the proper public role as centering on laying out streets and rights of way for other distributive networks, leaving

the use of lots and parcels to be determined in the market. subject to behavioral controls.

✓ Stewardship & equity - 3 fms. of land tax.

a-15, 3 kinds of K, how pervasively treated.

f. Self-contained, narcissistic land area. They don't belong in city, lack linkages, get in the way.

Large corps. that reduce linkages; Trade secrecy; internal promotion, seniority, pension. Also profus, inward-turned. like Unions.

Large port, owner is alt. to city. & a hindrance to it.

Citizen who stays put, works at civic duties, is better. Has roots in comm., cares about local govt., rather than reporting to big corps. hq. in N.Y.

Foster

Encourage

Promote

Nourish

Feed

Nurture

Incubate

Actuate

Induce

Invite

Stimulate

Aid

Aid

Support

Back

~~Induce~~

Animate

allow

Provide

Supply

The Synergistic City: ~~its~~ ~~the~~ ~~promise~~, ~~the~~ ~~problem~~, and ~~the~~ ~~fulfillment~~ its Potentials, ~~the~~ ~~hindrances~~

Intro. 9-31

I. The Urban Promise & the Land Use: the city that might have been, and be

A. ^{Neo-}Classic rationale. Reminder of old truths.

② { ~~the~~ Urban locn. thry. Least cost locn., Weber.

Idea of Von Thünen. ~~Not~~ Not just where, but how much land.

Elaborations of location theorists: Hoover, Isard. Relevance of "ag."

locn. thry. for cities;

① Neo-classic statements of E & W, Ratchiff. "Sorts & arranging."

Superiority of money to alt. criteria: Rent as sorter & arranger. Money more; net, not gross.

Min. xptn. costs, for customers & on-site workers & supplies.
Site goes to those needing it most, & min. load
on xptn.

③

Ricardo not forgotten; other site qualities considered, too.
Money the common denom.. makes commensurable.

④

Occasional lapse, rent drives w & k away. Hoover & Vernon
Canon. Neutralizes advantage of good locn. This is true
distributively -- owner changes for the advantage. But not true
re effic., i.e. rent doesn't prevent intens, but forces it.

To B, 2.

Omission from classic thry: assum. that social costs of
xptn = priv. costs. ^{Virtually ignored} Too little attention on uncr. rate structures. Even today,
rate reform focuses on other gns, not locn.

Chaff w. the wheat, ~~but~~ as w. all thies. - but a
good solid store of wheat.

B Underdewd. elements of neo-classic rationale.

1. ~~Compacting~~ & centripetal forces.

a. Continuity of l.v. -- Hurd

Economy of circulation (energy, K, time).
Avoiding energy-int. settlement patterns.

✓ Ec. & area-sensitive costs. UP-1.

✓ Compactness caused by one need power way for others
Total community UP-5, -11.

✓ Reduce interurban travel.

b. Coord & ~~signals~~. priv. & pub. invt. UP-7.

c. Mutual reflection. (A-6)

Same effect as internalizing externalities.

Realize gains of Pull atoms together w/o crushing them: assocn. w. independence. ~~the~~
scale w/o costs of scale.

d. ~~Ag returns~~ -- not to gross mass, but to access.

Nuclei, urban. Growth poles.

Alonso

Δ l.v. w/o - Δ w & i

✓ Density gradients.

1. ~~the~~ Compacting & centripetal force. ^{c) Growth}
urban nuclei. ^{a) Poles,}
a) ~~Hand on continuity of l.v.~~ $\rightarrow$

~~Agrets., elements of.~~

~~Reflection, mutual.~~

~~Density gradient~~

~~ent.~~
~~circulation (energy, K , time)~~

Economy of ~~steel~~ $\frac{1}{2}$ and all area sensitive costs, UP-1. (over)

b) Consider, 8 synch. & pub & priv. NP #7

3. Timing of impr. & replant, quantum leaps.
~~2.4.4.~~ ~~max p.v.~~

Poorly 'div'd in specific ref. to urban land.

Esply the prop. to rationalise wht. failures w. rising cost.

Ecto. group. have dev. near PV, & are gradually applying to land, succession of uses.

~~#2.~~ Mkt. failure, ~~Govt. failure~~ } distorted price system
~~Int'l bias.~~ allocn. by

~~Bias of unequal access to K, ^{and} collateral, power of accum. wealth.~~

~~Lies of tax system~~

~~"Explainers" tend over-explain, justify the unjustifiable. ^{Leads to} ~~cause~~ ^{some} dispute. But save the wheat~~

Compactness forced by one need, also opens door to others. UP #5
UP #11. Reduce interurban travel.

Losses

Detractions

Bleeding

Misconduits

Friction

Drains, leakage

Burdens

Weakening

Vulnerability

Tapping

Exploitation

Sapping

Urban Promise. Ideas, date.

P.1
UP-1

- ✓ 1. List area-sensitive public costs
- a. Fire protn., including brush & wild land fires
 - b. Flood control, drainage
 - c. Pest control
 - d. Aquifer recharge
 - e. Refuse collection
 - f. Smog control
 - g. Waste deposit (must be far from popn.)
 - h. Noxious land uses: gas stations, junkyards, drop-forges,
 - i. Noise control (protn. from runways, e.g.)
 - j. Interurban hi-speed transit.
 - k. Any other "hi-voltage" lines: gas, power, air, etc.
- 1/ pop. dispersed require at some point a 2d trunk line to a new center
- l. CBD - must duplicate.
 - m. Govt. -- e.g. n. Wis. Cities., must duplicate.
 - n. Distribn. & collection - say "CIRCULATION" networks
 - o. Any specialized service or facility, e.g. hosp. interior care unit.
 - p. Telecomm. (altho is priv.)

Evidence of
power of 2.
synergism

Hi bldgs in central cities - why go into dim. nets?

Labor & IC not cheaper.

Land dearer. Evidence of synergism, free lunch.

3. Observation bias re density

Density gains are whole-system gains.

Costs are part. costs

- to builder, dim. nets, vs. lg nets to spread.

- to immed. neighbors.

4. Basic concept of heart & arteries.

✓ 5. Land mkt. induces proxim.

Proxim. ~~costs~~ extra benefits:

a. Shorter trip for ea. linkage.

b. Ea. trip serves more purposes

c. Foot & mass transit

d. 3d dim., vert. xptn Δ linkages w/o loading streets

e. Reduce cross-traffic by Δ central tendency.

f. Bridging & piercing natural barriers becomes ec. at center, Δ mutual access there.

g. Load factors rise.

6. Need to segregate incompat. uses.

Old houses harboring crime are incompat. w. middle & upper class use of center - & mass transit.

a major problem

Mkt. wd. push them out. Mkt. failure keeps them in - plus error of using them for welfare system.

Guilt keeps us from analyzing, a mental block. Same for aged.

In public places, Gresham's Law. Offensiveness ^{drive out attractive.} dangerous. On priv. land, inverse " "

people reject others. Sappes drive out hosts.

To improve mkt. segn., max. priv. & min. public places.

Snobbery may play a role, & bias. But much more is involved, in general. There is also reverse or anti-snobbery, a hi value in parts of our culture.

But aversion to danger ~~to off~~ is objective. Offensiveness ~~is~~ could be partly bias, but WASPS are common offenders.

- ✓ 7 Mkt. helps p.w. coord
- After p.w. built, obviously
 - During sequence of bldg.
- Now, too long & thin at first. Bldr. must accommodate his uncertainty.
- So capac. is rarely opt. Too much, then too little. Requires later widening or twining.

Non-coord. of elements. Now, every indep. ut. mgr. makes his own guess. Then, all come together, they can be synch'd.

- 8 Some prt- K ~~uses~~ public -- autos. Parasitic
" " ~~sub. for~~ " -- elevators, toilets, solar heaters,
trash compactors
(Prt. wells sub. for pub. wtr., but use pub. aquifer.)

9. Refuse disposal is either dispersal or concn.
Dispersal requires open space
Conc. "

10. To min. damage - effic. of refuge:

- a. Release where pop. sparse
- b. Reduce time of pop. exposure. Conc. pop. for this, Conc. pop. allows carrying unreleased refuge thru pop. - then release.
- c. Keep conc'd.

✓ 11. Good cities reduce interurban travel & freight - they are more self-contained, do more for selves.

G. Holding land for future use

1. Common rationale empty land, hold for higher future use.
Downtime betw. uses. also for blighted land held by absentee & misdeed
Obviously a golden outlet for common preservation

2. Even if correct for indiv., involves social fallacies

a. Fall of comp. Radiates uncertainty. Hinders all the coord. & synch. described earlier

~~b. Front loading bias~~

c. Preys on public infrastructure. As circ. cost, hinders synergy. Littering

empty space → Add, as distance to winter land: food, refuse, bldg. materials, resorts, etc.
or reduced density, as before, re pattern.

d. A absentee owners, willing, blights unfolds.

→ Floor's value. cloud of poison gas in vain of expansion.

Farms run down. Wound. BD vicious run down, wounds CBA deeply, often mortally. Blighted prop. blights back.

e. Fed. ~~tax bias~~ pro

~~f. Why taken from prior use?~~

~~e. Radiates uncertainty~~

3. Hold₁ for own future use.

Is most likely to be viewed ~~as~~ legit, derive public support.

- Cultural bias vs. mkt., holding for self better than

hold₁ for sale

- Inc. tax bias, strong.

Esply. if for ^{possible} future expansion. Evides sympathy & understanding.

Fallacy of comp.

If everyone did it, destroy city

Neg. feedback -- one doing it makes others do it. Like vert. inter., controlling

If a few can do it, bias for wealth.

Front-runners advantage. Hi - ante game

for accum. wealth only.

Own raw mtl. instead of rely on mkt.

Hits mkt. at weakest point, makes it much weaker, nearly destroys

Arguments pro are mainly convenience of those wanting to get bigger. ~~But a free mkt. needs more small indep. owners.~~ ~~But why should society help them?~~ & healthy society both

Concn. is problem anyway. Any. is disc. of scale - let it remain so.

In fair mkt. max. DCF allows intertemp. max. That is enough - no favor needed.

Sym. City

~~Add to Paradise paper~~

a-1

~~The Urban Promise,~~

Choice
Scraps

~~Pic Paths on the Pathway to Paradise: Market Failure, Govt Failure, and
Some Solutions~~

✓ 1. Too much choice, metro areas, leads to sequegn., school
problem. See 9

✓ 2. ^{energy-intensive} ~~1 movement~~ settlement pattern, basis of nat. weakness.

3. Zoning came in when ^{racial} covenants went out.

4. The ~~at~~ propensity of Councils to act irrationally is ^{high} ~~formidable~~.
e.g. sewer charges based on per 1,000 sq. ft.

5. Urban Symbiosis, Urban Parasitism, and the Urban
The Symbiotic City, parasitic and their correction.
Transmuting parasites to symbiotes
The Urban Promise, problem, & solutions. transmuting
parasites into symbiotes
parasitic to synergistic effects

The Synergistic City, its ^{Weaknesses} Parasites, and their Control.
~~Parasitic Sapping~~ Sappers and their ^{redirection} control.

The Synergistic City, its Sappers, and their
Constructive Reconversion.

-- its Sapping Parasites, and some remedies.

6 Why es. of scale to land shd. be public.

Circu. is public bus; bldg. is priv. bus.

Circu. inside priv. land is ambiguous, and ~~becomes more~~ as land unit grows larger, role of public needs.

Large owners replace local govt: plantations, ~~states~~ Desert Land Act, co. towns, new towns, planned unit devts (PUDs), Rock. Centers, shopping centers, tracts, latifundia, benefices, patrimonium,

If we let large owners collect for spillovers, we give them advantage. Small owners create them too, but give them away.

Get atomistic owners bounce them back & forth, & result in same intensification. (I wonder if this also applies to oil exploration.)

"Total Community" comes from putting atoms together w/o crushing them: association w/ independence. Thus gain es. of scale w/o penalties.

✓ Large owners spend yrs. assembling or holding tracts before div. Thus sap remainder of city. They delay div. part. to avoid lg tax on remainder. They throw too much on mkt. at once, finally.

Intens. exts...
phantom gains of scale.

A city is a PUD - it x-subsidizes, and at best this keeps up one market. b/c. of externalities.
So a city can do what PUD does. PUD may have better maint. than city, but that's not enough. It has also to manage all the priv. bldg. and remain responsive to all the owners.

✓ Separate PUDs, ^{self-contained,} cannot combine to make a city, there is no comm. direction or design. They oversee a few public trunks.

See 32, 11

7. Tract bldg. is the main contrib. of p.u.d. -- not the showcases usually cited, which are exceptional, & often lose m.

Tract bldg. comes b/c. muni. broke down in '29. They failed to sync. p.u. & priv. bldg. B/c. they failed to tax lots enough.

Cookie-cutter subdiv. ticky-tacky houses.

8. Seeing the whole system - makes us more favorable to hi density.

9. Hi density Δ s exposure; & $\therefore$ Δ s selectivity of screening.
Leads to segm. & social division, a chis. of urban scale.

To achieve & hold es. of synergism, must overcome this.

Sloughing civic duties is a form of sapping.
But absenteeism is largely to blame - happens in farm areas too, & mining & forestry.

Suburbanizer & sprawl also to blame, autos replac. mass transit.

10. "Slums" result in part from urban failure

- retarded renewal

✓ - CBD sprawl, commercial penumbra, spec. effect[‡]

- subsidies to migration, & to outlands

- low mp of labor; hi taxes on poor workers; low

empl. opps.

- land ruined by excretion of others.

11. Blighted land blights back. Mutual sapping. Contagious.
Gifted land gives back.

[‡] Just as farmer will avoid farm K use if expects resid. use to follow, so ~~the~~ owner of potential comm. land avoids resid.

12. Mass transit ~~requires~~ needs not just density, but use by social leaders, who must be closer to mass of riders than now.

Alienation, more than segregr. is problem.

~~Old~~ Old South reconciled segregr. & mass transit.

~~But~~ The relationship was wrong, but at least there was one.

Unearned wealth makes class ~~society~~ divisions.

Exclusionary treatment of knowledge abets this division. Cliques, scholastics, closed profs., closed shops

13. CBD needs not to blight, but to aid adjoining land for its own survival. Stop radiating spec. ~~to~~ values that blight.

14. Gresham's Law of public places. Sappers drive out givers. hosts. Offensive drive out attractive.

Management & moves needed, to offset.

Putting it down as ~~calling it~~ snobbery is too easy. Danger, noise, rape & robbery ~~is~~ are objective. Cultural presn. is less so, yet one preferring Beethoven to ~~Alice Cooper~~ Pink Rock cd. have other reasons, & - Beethoven was a democrat. after all, cd. to the neo-fashion of ^{some} ~~making~~ pink rockers.

But greatest danger ^{& pollution} is from autos & trucks, those symbols of aristoc. & regn.

15. Some part. K saps public ^{or other part.} res.: autos, trucks, boats, planes, wells, dune buggies, ATVs, snowmobiles, combustion machines, highways

Such sapping K is least likely to be taxed.
"Supporting" ~~sustaining~~ ^{or "preemptive K"}
"Nourishing" K ~~helps~~ enhances other res.

~~etc.~~

"Substg" K relieves load from public res.: elevator, solar heaters, toilets, trash compactors

16. Positive relatedness, or comphy.

a. Vertical comphy. Upstream-downstream, in series.

b. i) Horiz. comphy. Common supply, common customers, comphy. & parallelism.

ii) Specializn. differentiation - thus assembling unique excellencies.

17. There is lots of 'noise' in the mkt. communic. network, at best. The pulse beat is weak. So rather than highest use, there are many diversionary elements.

An. true believer says "the mkt. resolves all" but really is more like multiple regression. You have to purify the data to know what the true call of the mkt. may be.

To make mkt. work, i.e., we must remove noise; and/or exagg. the call of the consumer by leverage amplifying

~~One noise to elim.~~

Even ~~as~~ a tax on net inc. is bad, i.e., bcs. it weakens mkt. signal ~~of~~ cfd. to noise, (& adds noise.)

Bldg. tax is worse, it weakens higher uses. It changes the ordering - we are not in a continuum, where the mkt. wd. lead to equal intensities adjacent. This is bcs. the neighboring uses are of different kinds, using diff. K , whose indivisibilities differ.

In a fair (unbiased) mkt. there is a sketch, where hi-rises (10/1) wd. mix w. groceries (1/1) w/o counting inventory, and ~~3~~ 1/1 counting it, and a few gas stations (1/4/1) and retail (2/1) a K tax

shifted to ground changes the ranking.

It also makes land cheaper & encourages all to spread out.

It's not just diffs. re indivis^{ibilities} that make diff. K/L ratios in "fair mkt." Also, re diff. rets some uses can rise easier than others -- offices easier than indy. w. heavy materials flows, e.g.

✓ Thus there are quantum jumps among competing, neighboring uses. Also, re ripening, among successive ones.

✓ 18. "Fair mkt." is better term than "free mkt."

Means a mkt. w/o inst. bias.

Too many are hung up on mngy. as the only inst. bias.

✓ 19. Access is mutual, so presence of seekers attracts more seekers. Clustering is self-reinforcing.

20. Bldg. taxes ~~excess~~ ^{nudge towards} subsg. land for K. Thus, they are not 100% capd. into lower LV?

City can spread out, so they bring in elast. supply. They cannot bring it into center, however. Center can spread out too, tho.

Net, the Δ demand for land shd. prevent full capn. E.g., suppose no expansion were possible at all - no new roads. There wd. then be higher lot coverage. This one factor might keep l.v. from falling by the full amt of the bldg. tax.

But there are several other factors of excess burden, also, as city spreads out, lose mutual access.

21. 'Mystery of broken skyline' is not entirely biased what. In a fair what. there is not = intensity - v. 17. But bldg. taxes & land spec. help.

22. Bldg. taxes reduce bidding power of hi-rise, making it a lower use -- so it can still buy cheap land, & it pops up on cheaper land.

A natural scarcity of K wd. do same, except re ripening. Bldg. taxes drive investor into seeking l.v. Δ s.

✓ 23. Variety, individuality, excitement, discovery -- mutual access at its best yields these.

24. l.v. jumps up & down in boom-bust cycles, so K-int. bldg. is spotted around.

25. Employers in city, more choice of labor - thus better able to avoid strangulation by unions.

26. Even more than highrise, the desire to tax "industry" explains bldg. taxes.

Some kinds of indy. do have hi K/L: lofts, Allen Bradley etc.

Indy. using acreage has underused land.

27. Anticg. zoning problems, all sappers seek to estab. preser. sts. - hit this.

Cities, in turn, preserve land for feeders, supporters

Thus, compn. for control of land critics. use of land - except the sappers do use it, as pioneers & blight new areas.

✓ 28. Library as analogy. Value is no. of options. Add demand curves vertically. City is place for public goods.

29. To avoid frequent moves & family problems, attachment to metrop. is better than to a big co.

30. Effect of rev.-sharing - reduce pressure to perform.

There are many kinds of rev.-sharing.

E.g. HUD "Comm. Dev." "program" - actually a giveaway. "Get the money out" \$4b/yr. now.

✓ 31. The Urban Promise, and Pitfalls on the Path

The

~~Synergy, Cities, and~~

the Urban Promise,

Cities, Synergy and Sapping: ~~Pitfalls on the Path to~~

The Synergistic City:

Problems and some solutions

~~Urban Synergy~~: Its Promise, Its Obstacles, and Its Fulfillment

Intro

The object of human orgn. is synergy, ^{combining parts into} a whole greater than their sum. ~~of its parts~~ Large orgns. seek ~~to~~ synergy in hierarchy and financial controls. Cities achieve it by bringing indep. actors into close mutual access so they can coop. via free contracts in the mkt.

Then outline whole paper.

32. Atomistic landowners ~~create~~ spill over external bens, too - but don't collect for them directly. City orgn. must help them. Otherwise, large owners have an edge, even tho they don't ~~create~~ spill over create more bens.

- ✓ 33. Higher inc. taxes in city - cite BLS.
- ✓ 34. Output / Cap. $\propto$ size of city. Alonso.
35. CBDs are colonies of suburban commuters.